Democratizing Rule Development by Sant\u27Ambrogio, Michael & Staszewski, Glen
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 98 Issue 3 
2021 
Democratizing Rule Development 
Michael Sant'Ambrogio 
Michigan State University College of Law 
Glen Staszewski 
Michigan State University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Sant'Ambrogio and Glen Staszewski, Democratizing Rule Development, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 793 
(2021). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol98/iss3/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 












DEMOCRATIZING RULE DEVELOPMENT 
MICHAEL SANT’AMBROGIO & GLEN STASZEWSKI* 
ABSTRACT 
Agencies make many of their most important decisions in rulemaking 
well before the publication of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), 
when they set their regulatory agendas and develop proposals for public 
comment. Agencies’ need for information from outside parties and openness 
to alternative courses of action are also generally at their greatest during 
these earlier stages of the rulemaking process. Yet regulatory agenda 
setting and rule development have received virtually no scholarly attention. 
The literature generally treats what happens before publication of the 
NPRM as a “black box” and suggests that agenda setting and rule 
development are primarily influenced by political considerations and 
pressure from well-organized groups. Other interested stakeholders, 
including regulatory beneficiaries, smaller regulated entities, state, local, 
and tribal governments, unaffiliated experts, individuals with situated 
knowledge of the regulatory issues, and members of the general public, are 
routinely absent.  
While there is undoubtedly much truth to this understanding, a recent 
study we conducted for the Administrative Conference of the United States 
unearthed significant efforts by numerous federal agencies to engage the 
public long before the publication of an NPRM. The existing efforts, 
however, tend to be relatively unstructured, unsystematic, and ad hoc. 
Moreover, many opportunities for public engagement are voluntary and 
self-selecting, which do little to overcome the barriers to participation by 
traditionally absent stakeholders. Rule development thus warrants more 
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systematic focus and attention to ensure that agencies fully engage all 
relevant stakeholders in each rulemaking in which they have relevant 
knowledge, experience, or views—thereby promoting the democratic 
aspirations of regulation.  
This Article lays the theoretical and practical foundation for more fully 
democratizing rule development by envisioning what a robust institutional 
commitment to meaningful public engagement in agenda setting and rule 
development would entail and developing a structural framework for 
facilitating quality participation by traditionally absent stakeholders during 
these crucial early stages of rulemaking. Democratizing rule development 
would not only improve the quality and legitimacy of agency rules, it could 
also help to build a culture of civic participation to address the ailing health 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public engagement with rulemaking enhances both the effectiveness and 
democratic legitimacy of policymaking by federal regulatory agencies.1 
 
1. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 65–66 (1969); 
see also CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 31 (4th ed. 2010) (“Rulemaking adds opportunities for and dimensions 
to public participation that are rarely present in the deliberations of Congress or other legislatures.”); 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8, at 368 (4th ed. 2002) (noting 
rulemaking’s democratic character). 











While agencies possess substantial expertise, agency officials are not 
omniscient. They frequently need information from regulated industries, 
regulatory beneficiaries, unaffiliated experts, and citizens with situated 
knowledge of the field to fully understand regulatory problems and potential 
solutions, including their attendant costs and benefits. 2  The public may 
identify problems the agency has not seen, illuminate direct and collateral 
effects, propose solutions the agency has not considered, and identify 
unintended consequences of certain actions. Potential regulatory 
beneficiaries have first-hand knowledge about the problems agencies seek 
to address and the likely impact of potential solutions.3 Regulated entities 
have information about the workability and costs of different proposals, 
collateral consequences, and the likelihood of achieving compliance.4 The 
public may also clarify ambiguities that would undermine the agency’s 
goals due to confusion regarding what a rule would require. 
Public engagement also enhances the democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of federal agencies and the regulations they promulgate.5 
Agencies exercise immense policy-making authority without direct 
electoral checks.6 Requiring agencies to consider and respond to public 
comments in a reasoned fashion improves the democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of agency action from a variety of theoretical views. Indeed, 
the democratic character of the notice-and-comment process established by 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was one of the justifications for 
the turn from case-by-case adjudication to informal rulemaking as the 
preferred means of implementing policy during the post-war period.7 The 
APA requires federal agencies to publish their proposals and give any 
 
2. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 109 (1982) (“The central problem of 
the standard-setting process and the most pressing task facing many agencies is gathering the 
information needed to write a sensible standard.”). 
3. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 1193, 1202–03 (1982) (describing regulatory beneficiaries); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory 
Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 452 (2007) (same).  
4. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1346 (2010); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1713–14 (1975) (recognizing that “the information upon which the agency must 
ultimately base its decision must come to a large degree from the groups being regulated.”).  
5. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Foreword, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2011) (“An agency’s public proposal of a rule and acceptance of 
public comment prior to issuing the final rule can help us view the agency decision as democratic and 
thus essentially self-legitimating.”).  
6. See JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 10 (1978) (“Criticism of the administrative agencies has been animated by a 
strong and persisting challenge to the basic legitimacy of the administrative process itself.”); Cynthia R. 
Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
987, 987 (1997) (“Like an intriguing but awkward family heirloom, the legitimacy problem is handed 
down from generation to generation of administrative law scholars.”). 
7. PIERCE, supra note 1, at 368; M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 












interested member of the public the opportunity to comment with “data, 
views, or arguments.”8  Agencies are legally obligated to consider these 
comments and address salient issues raised by them in a reasoned fashion.9  
Regulatory reformers seeking to enhance public participation in 
rulemaking have focused their efforts on broadening “the public” that 
participates in the notice-and-comment process. Although formally quite 
open and democratic, in practice well-organized groups of sophisticated 
stakeholders often dominate public participation in notice and comment.10 
While public interest organizations representing regulatory beneficiaries 
also participate, regulated entities and business groups tend to participate at 
significantly higher rates and have a disproportionate influence on the 
process. Typically absent, however, are most regulatory beneficiaries, 
smaller regulated entities, state, local, and tribal governments, unaffiliated 
experts, stakeholders with situated knowledge of the regulatory issues, and 
the general public. Moreover, on the rare occasions when agencies do 
receive large numbers of public comments, they tend to be the product of 
orchestrated campaigns by well-organized interest groups, provide largely 
duplicative information about pre-political preferences, and are of marginal 
value to agency rule writers.11  
Much effort has been devoted to tackling these problems and enhancing 
the accessibility and democratic legitimacy of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. Most recently, these efforts have focused on moving the 
legislative rulemaking process online and using social media and other web-
based tools to encourage participation by a broader portion of the public.12 
There have even been some innovative efforts to target absent stakeholders 
with information or experience germane to particular rulemakings, foster 
deliberation among diverse interests concerning agencies’ proposals, and 
 
8. 5 U.S.C. § 553.  
9. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Glen Staszewski, Judicial Review of Agency 
Discretion, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 195 (Michael E. 
Herz et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015).  
10. See infra Part II.C. 
11. See Cynthia R. Farina, Mary Newhart & Josiah Heidt, Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging 
and Nudging Public Participation that Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 123, 132–45 (2012) 
(claiming that mass comments have little value in rulemaking); Michael A. Livermore, Vladimir 
Eidelman & Brian Grom, Computationally Assisted Regulatory Participation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
977 (2018) (recognizing the logistical difficulties and explaining that natural language processing 
technology can identify identical comments and streamline and improve the review process). 
12. Press Release, Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Regulations.gov to Transform U.S. Rulemaking 
Process and Save Nearly $100 Million (Jan. 23, 2003) (on file with authors); Beth Simone Noveck, The 
Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 435 (2004). 











educate rulemaking novices on how to participate effectively in the notice-
and-comment process.13  
Yet agencies make many of their most important decisions in rulemaking 
well before the publication of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). 
Long before agencies publish their proposals, they set their regulatory 
agendas and decide which issues or problems they will and will not address. 
Then, during rule development, agencies determine which policy 
alternatives receive serious consideration and draft the precise details (and 
resulting trade-offs) of their proposed rules. These early decisions frame the 
issues that will be addressed during notice and comment and strongly 
influence the contents of promulgated regulations. 14  Indeed, there is a 
widespread perception that agencies are unwilling to make major changes 
to their policies once they have published an NPRM.15 This may be a natural 
result of path dependence whereby agency officials who have already 
devoted substantial thought and effort to a problem are reluctant to reverse 
or dramatically change course relatively late in the day,16 and it is a tendency 
that is likely reinforced by certain aspects of judicial and political review of 
agency rulemaking.17  
Despite their importance, regulatory agenda setting and rule 
development have received virtually no scholarly attention to date. The 
literature generally treats what happens before publication of the NPRM as 
a “black box” and suggests that agenda setting and rule development are 
primarily influenced by political considerations and pressure from well-
organized groups. To the extent this is true, agenda setting and rule 
development would reinforce and perhaps exacerbate the imbalances in 
participation that are evident in the notice-and-comment process. While 
efforts to improve notice and comment are therefore worthwhile, fully 
 
13. The most notable example is the “Regulation Room” project conducted by the Cornell 
eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI) in collaboration with two federal agencies during the Obama 
administration. See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart, Claire Cardie & Dan Cosley, 
Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2011); infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (describing 
this project). 
14. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 419 (2018) (explaining that “the very act of 
conceptualizing and defining a metaphorical system [for analyzing public policy choices], and the 
accompanying choice-of-scope decisions, constitute inherently normative decisions that are value laden 
and political in nature”). 
15. See William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules and the 
Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 576, 582 (2009) (“[T]here is a common perception 
among those who participate in and study the administrative process that rulemaking initiatives become 
increasingly difficult to stop or alter as they progress in their development.”) (citation omitted).  
16. See id. (recognizing that “sunk organizational costs . . . may reinforce agencies’ commitment 
to proposed rules”).  












democratizing legislative rulemaking also requires enhancing public 
engagement with regulatory decision-making well before an NPRM.  
This Article presents the first focused look at how federal agencies can 
enhance public engagement in agenda setting and rule development. 
Benefiting from unusual access provided by the Administrative Conference 
of the United States (ACUS), we spoke with dozens of agency officials 
involved in rulemaking and public engagement efforts across the 
administrative state.18 This Article presents our findings and identifies the 
broad range of tools beyond notice and comment that agencies use to engage 
the public with their rulemaking process. We then show (1) how agencies 
can expand on this foundation to develop a more durable infrastructure for 
meaningful public engagement early in the regulatory process, and (2) why 
as both a practical and theoretical matter this is likely to be a more 
successful strategy for democratizing rulemaking than the existing 
approaches alone. 
First and foremost, ordinary citizens, unaffiliated experts, and missing 
stakeholders with situated knowledge of regulatory problems have much to 
add during the earlier stages of the regulatory process, when agencies 
establish their priorities and evaluate alternative solutions and preliminary 
proposals—and before the agency has made up its mind about which course 
of action to pursue. Moreover, because various segments of the public may 
have different contributions to make at each stage of the regulatory process, 
there is much to be gained by taking a broader view of rulemaking and 
thinking carefully about what information and stakeholders may be missing 
at each stage, the relevant information different stakeholders possess, and 
the tools most likely to generate this information.  
Second, enhancing public engagement in this way is likely to be a more 
successful strategy for democratizing rulemaking than enhanced 
presidential control, merely moving rulemaking online, or encouraging 
participation after the publication of an NPRM. The President has never 
proven to be an entirely satisfactory cure to the “democracy deficit” of 
rulemaking because the President simply cannot supervise the vast majority 
of rulemakings and, even if he could, many doubt how much democratic 
legitimacy any single representative can lend regulatory actions given the 
diverse interests and perspectives of the American public. 19  Moreover, 
 
18. See Administrative Conference Recommendation 2018–7, Public Engagement in 
Rulemaking, 84 Fed. Reg. 2139, 2146 (Feb. 6, 2019). 
19. See Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”: A Theoretical 
and Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 612 
(2013) (discussing “perceptions of a ‘democracy deficit’ in the workings of the administrative state”); 
Farina, supra note 6, at 988 (“[S]trong presidentialism . . . is premised upon a fundamentally untenable 
conception of the consent of the governed. The ‘will of the people,’ as invoked in that effort, is artificially 
 











despite the early optimism around e-rulemaking, it has not fundamentally 
altered who participates in most rulemaking nor meaningfully improved the 
substance of public comments. 20  Finally, while efforts to improve 
participation in notice and comment itself are certainly worthwhile, they 
may come too late, after the agency has already made many of its most 
important decisions and committed itself to a particular proposal. Enhancing 
public engagement in rule development is therefore likely to yield relevant 
information earlier in the process and lend greater democratic legitimacy to 
rulemaking than the competing models alone. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the importance of 
public engagement to regulatory decision-making by federal agencies. 
Broad public input in rulemaking improves the quality of regulation by 
enhancing the information and views available to agency officials when 
tackling regulatory problems. At the same time, opportunities for public 
input and the obligation of agencies to respond in a reasoned fashion and to 
justify their decisions in public-regarding terms enhance the democratic 
legitimacy and accountability of regulatory policymaking.21 To date, efforts 
to increase public participation in regulatory governance have focused 
almost exclusively on broadening the notice-and-comment process. 
 Part II highlights the limited scholarly attention directed at public 
engagement with agency decision-making before the publication of an 
NPRM and the resulting limitations in our knowledge of agency agenda 
setting and rule development. While agenda setting by policymakers has 
received substantial attention from social scientists in other contexts,22 this 
vital topic has thus far received minimal attention from scholars of 
administrative agencies and the regulatory process. 23  Similarly, rule 
 
bounded in time, homogenized, shorn of ambiguities—in short, fabricated.”); Glen Staszewski, Political 
Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 867–72 (2012) 
(criticizing the presidential control model as “deeply problematic”). 
20. MICHAEL HERZ, USING SOCIAL MEDIA IN RULEMAKING: POSSIBILITIES AND BARRIERS, 
FINAL REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (Nov. 21, 2013) 
(“[T]he move online has not produced a fundamental shift in the nature of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.”); Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 
DUKE L.J. 943, 958 (2006) (“[N]either agencies’ acceptance of comments by email nor the development 
of the Regulations.gov portal have led to any dramatic changes in the general level or quality of public 
participation in the rulemaking process.”). 
21. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1343; Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and 
Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1282–83 (2009) (explaining how reason-giving promotes 
democratic legitimacy); Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political 
Science, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 497, 502 (2008) (describing legitimacy as “the process by which . . . 
collective decisions can be morally justified to those who are bound by them. It is the key defining 
element of deliberative democracy.”).  
22. See, e.g., JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984). 
23. See Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory 












development has received almost no focused attention from scholars.24 The 
literature generally treats what happens before publication of the NPRM as 
a “black box” and suggests that agenda setting and rule development are 
primarily influenced by political considerations and pressure from well-
organized groups.25  
Although there is undoubtedly much truth to this view, Part III shows 
that the reality is not quite so bleak. Based on our research for ACUS, we 
unearthed numerous efforts by federal agencies to engage the public with 
their agenda setting and rule development activities.26 These include the use 
of rulemaking petitions, federal advisory committees, focus groups, 
requests for information, listening sessions and other public hearings, 
hotlines or suggestion boxes, public complaints, various forms of web-
based outreach, negotiated rulemaking, and advance notices of proposed 
rulemaking. 27  Nevertheless, the existing efforts tend to be relatively 
unstructured, unsystematic, and ad hoc.28 Moreover, existing opportunities 
for public engagement are often voluntary and self-selective. This raises 
concerns that public participation at this stage could be imbalanced and 
facilitate regulatory capture. Thus, rule development warrants more 
systematic attention to ensure that agencies are fully engaging all relevant 
stakeholders in each rulemaking in which they may have relevant 
knowledge, experiences, or views.  
Part IV envisions what a robust institutional commitment to meaningful 
public engagement in agenda setting and rule development would entail. 
This includes planning for public participation early in the regulatory 
process, developing policies for public engagement, and establishing 
mechanisms to ensure that those policies are consistently followed. Public 
engagement with rule development also requires targeted outreach and 
educational efforts, which could be facilitated by social media and advanced 
digital communications technologies. Part IV thus highlights the kinds of 
information most useful to agencies at each stage of the rulemaking process 
and the best practices for soliciting thoughtful public input or comment prior 
to publication of a proposed rule. It concludes by comparing the 
democratization of rule development with the competing models from both 
a theoretical and practical perspective. 
Although scholars have devoted significant efforts to improving the 
operation of notice-and-comment rulemaking, the regulatory state remains 
 
24. For the exception that proves the rule, see West, supra note 15, at 583, noting that “[s]cholars 
have practically ignored these earlier processes.” 
25. See generally Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: 
An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99 (2011).  
26. See infra Part III. 
27. See infra Part III.A–III.B. 
28. See infra Part III.D. 











under siege from different quarters.29  Indeed, the Trump administration 
rejected and dismantled some of the most innovative public engagement 
efforts of its predecessor and unduly politicized many regulatory decisions. 
President-elect Biden has pledged to repair and strengthen the regulatory 
state. Thus, one of the most valuable projects at this time is to develop a 
blueprint for institutionalizing public engagement with rule development 
and thereby provide a bulwark against administration of the laws based on 
narrow, factional interests. This Article begins that project. 
I. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN RULEMAKING 
Public participation in rulemaking serves several vital functions. First, it 
improves the quality of regulations by providing agencies with better and 
more comprehensive information. 30  While agencies possess substantial 
expertise, agency officials are not omniscient and frequently need 
information from regulated industries, regulatory beneficiaries, unaffiliated 
experts, and citizens with situated knowledge of the field to fully understand 
regulatory problems and potential solutions, including their attendant costs 
and benefits.31 Notice and comment was designed in large part to provide 
agencies with more and better information upon which to base their 
regulatory choices, 32  and it ideally operates to “ensure that agency 
regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public comment.” 33 
Otherwise, “an agency’s perspective . . . might not extend beyond the views 
of the [agency] staff or the client groups with whom the staff regularly 
consults.” 34  Members of the public may identify problems or propose 
solutions that the agency has not considered, reframe the relevant issues or 
highlight the potentially competing values at stake, and identify unintended 
ambiguities or unanticipated problems with a proposal that should be 
clarified or avoided. Regulated entities often have the most direct access to 
 
29. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
30. See Transparency and Open Government, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“Public engagement enhances the 
Government's effectiveness and improves the quality of its decisions. Knowledge is widely dispersed in 
society, and public officials benefit from having access to that dispersed knowledge.”). 
31. See BREYER, supra note 2, at 109. 
32. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 31 (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL] (“The objective [of notice 
and comment] should be to assure informed administrative action and adequate protection to private 
interests.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 6 (1941) (noting how the APA “improve[s] . . . the rule-making process 
by emphasizing the importance of outside participation”). 
33. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 
1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
34. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 












information about the workability and costs of different alternatives, 
collateral consequences, and the likelihood of achieving compliance. 35 
Potential regulatory beneficiaries also have a personal stake in agency 
decision-making, and they may have first-hand knowledge regarding the 
problems agencies seek to address and the likely impact of alternative 
solutions.36  
Second, public engagement with rulemaking enhances the democratic 
legitimacy and accountability of federal agencies and the regulations they 
promulgate.37 Agencies exercise immense policy-making authority without 
direct electoral checks.38 Requiring agencies to respond to the public in a 
reasoned fashion improves the democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
agency action from a variety of theoretical views. It promotes due-process 
objectives, particularly from the perspective of regulated entities, by 
ensuring that those effected by government policies have a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard before such policies are implemented.39 It is crucial 
to the interest group representation model of administrative law, whereby 
government officials are expected to implement majoritarian or pluralistic 
preferences. 40  And it is critical to the political control model of 
administrative law, which legitimizes discretionary agency actions based on 
the oversight of elected officials, who themselves are politically accountable 
to voters.41 While this theory is also based on majoritarian or pluralistic 
conceptions of democracy, it is representative rather than direct in its 
orientation, and the primary function of public engagement from this 
perspective is to bring unpopular or potentially problematic agency 
proposals to the attention of elected officials so they can intervene.42  
Finally, public participation is essential to deliberative models of 
administrative legitimacy, which require public officials to engage in a 
decision-making process that considers all relevant interests and 
perspectives and provides reasoned explanations for policy choices that 
could be accepted by free and equal citizens with fundamentally competing 
 
35. See Wagner, supra note 4, at 1346; Stewart, supra note 4, at 1713–14.  
36. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
37. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1343; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican 
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992).  
38. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; Mendelson, supra note 3, at 417 (“As a theoretical 
matter, scholars have struggled to locate a source of democratic legitimacy for administrative agencies, 
which the Constitution does not mention and whose officials are not directly elected.”).  
39. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 32, at 34.  
40. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1711–12 (describing this model).  
41. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, Rodger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, The Political 
Economy of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1651, 1663 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell eds., 2007); Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 53, 56–58 (2008).  
42. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures 
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 258–59 (1987).  











views. 43  Agency decisions adopted pursuant to these criteria are 
democratically legitimate because each interest and perspective is treated 
with equal respect and arbitrary decision-making is prohibited. 44 
Deliberative democratic theory seeks to eliminate arbitrary decisions and 
promote courses of action that best promote the public good in light of the 
available information and fundamental differences of opinion.45  
Democracy is an essentially contested concept. The proper 
understandings of democratic legitimacy and accountability in regulatory 
governance are fundamentally contested as well. Yet there is, in effect, an 
incompletely theorized agreement that public participation in the regulatory 
process promotes basic democratic values. Whether one emphasizes 
fundamental fairness to regulated entities, a desire to promote the will of the 
people that emerges from interest group politics, the need to provide fire 
alarms to bring salient agency action to the attention of elected politicians, 
or the obligation of agency officials to engage in reasoned deliberation on 
how to promote the public good, there is virtually unanimous agreement that 
public participation is vital to securing a legitimate place for agency 
lawmaking within American democracy.46  
Regulatory reformers seeking to enhance public engagement with the 
regulatory process have focused their attention on improving notice-and-
comment rulemaking. The APA requires agencies to publish most proposed 
rules in the Federal Register and give interested members of the public an 
opportunity to comment before the rules are finalized. Moreover, agencies 
are required to respond to salient public comments in a reasoned fashion, 
explaining why the public’s “written data, views, or arguments” did or did 
not result in changes to the rule. 47  Otherwise, final rules risk judicial 
invalidation. Although the notice-and-comment rulemaking process is 
formally quite open and democratic,48 in practice it is often dominated by 
 
43. See, e.g., HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT 
THE ENDS OF POLICY 213 (2002); Staszewski, supra note 19, at 857–58. For influential accounts of this 
deliberative ideal, see AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 55 
(1996); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17, 22–23 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989); John Rawls, The Idea of 
Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 773 (1997). 
44. Staszewski, supra note 21, at 1282–83; Thompson, supra note 21, at 502.  
45. See, e.g., RICHARDSON, supra note 43, at 17 (seeking to develop a conception of public 
reasoning that would “reconcile administrative discretion with democratic control in such a way as to 
prevent bureaucratic power from being exercised arbitrarily”).  
46. There are, however, still some commentators who believe that it is unconstitutional for 
Congress to delegate broad lawmaking authority to agencies. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).  
47.  5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
48. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 65 (describing the process as “one of the greatest inventions of 













well-organized groups of sophisticated stakeholders.49 Accordingly, efforts 
to democratize rulemaking have sought to broaden participation in notice 
and comment by moving the process online, targeting absent stakeholders 
with information and views relevant to the proposed rule, and creating tools 
to encourage relatively informed and robust interactive online deliberation 
among diverse groups with different stakes in the regulation. To date, 
however, the impact of moving the rulemaking process online, without 
more, has been modest.50 While it is certainly easier for interested parties to 
obtain access to relevant information about agency activities, e-rulemaking 
has not dramatically increased the level or quality of participation in the 
notice-and-comment process.51  
More promising have been efforts that combine e-rulemaking and social 
media with innovative outreach, education, and deliberative forums 
designed to create richer opportunities for public engagement by 
traditionally absent stakeholders with specific rulemakings. The most 
prominent example is the Cornell eRulemaking Initiative’s (CeRI) work in 
collaboration with the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) during the Obama administration, 
more commonly known as “Regulation Room.” 52  A cross-disciplinary 
group of faculty and students summarized in plain language the significant 
issues in several NPRMs, highlighted key questions for commenters to 
address, and created a user-friendly interface for online deliberation. 53 
Regulation Room supplemented its user-friendly web architecture with 
robust outreach to traditionally absent stakeholders and active moderation 
by students trained in law and group facilitation.54 These efforts produced 
many examples of situated knowledge from traditionally absent 
stakeholders—including consumers, truck drivers, small trucking 
companies, and travelers with disabilities—which were helpful to agency 
 
participate in rulemaking as “one of the most fundamental, important, and far-reaching of democratic 
rights.”).  
49. See infra notes 109–114 and accompanying text.  
50. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
51. See Coglianese, supra note 20, at 958; HERZ, supra note 20, at 40–42 (noting many instances 
in which engagement by the “lay public” with agency regulation has failed to produce novel or helpful 
ideas). 
52. Farina et al., supra note 13. Professor Cynthia R. Farina of Cornell Law School served as the 
Principle Investigator for CeRI, and Mary J. Newhart, also of Cornell Law School, served as its 
Executive Director. The CeRI team included professors of Computing and Information Science and 
Communication, as well as experts in design, communications, conflict resolution, technology, and e-
Government. 
53. See Farina et al., supra note 13, at 412; Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 
Characters or Less: Social Networking and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 382, 
390–91 (2011).  
54. See Farina et al., supra note 13, at 413.  











rulemaking. 55  Before the close of the comment period, the Cornell 
researchers summarized the online discussion and invited participants to 
suggest revisions before submitting the summary as a formal comment in 
the rulemaking proceeding using Regulations.gov.56 CERI’s work points 
the way toward more promising forms of public engagement with 
rulemaking, and such initiatives should be more widely adopted.  
Yet many of the most important regulatory decisions are made long 
before the publication of an NPRM, when agencies set their agendas and 
develop and refine the proposals they will later publish for public comment. 
In contrast to the notice-and-comment process, scholars have given little 
attention to enhancing public participation in these regulatory decisions. 
Moreover, the APA provides virtually no institutional framework for broad 
public engagement during this period,57 which is often viewed as a “black 
box” dominated by powerful political interests. While efforts to improve 
notice and comment are undoubtedly worthwhile, fully democratizing 
rulemaking requires engaging the public well before the publication of an 
NPRM. 
II. THE BLACK BOX OF RULE DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Importance of Agenda Setting and Rule Development 
Federal agencies are routinely delegated broad authority, have 
substantial discretion to choose which specific issues or problems to tackle 
at any given time, and are limited in what they can address by resource 
constraints. Agencies must therefore inevitably identify the particular issues 
or problems they plan to resolve and establish their highest priorities.58 Even 
when Congress sets much of an agency’s agenda through mandatory 
rulemaking obligations, the agency will still need to establish priorities 
among various statutory requirements and other discretionary goals. 
Agenda setting is also the stage when agencies are likely to be least well 
informed about a potential regulatory problem and thus most open minded 
about the best course of action. During early rule development the agency 
is gathering information, beginning to identify and evaluate various 
alternative options, and is often open minded about whether or how to 
 
55. See CYNTHIA R. FARINA, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, RULEMAKING 2.0: 
UNDERSTANDING WHAT BETTER PUBLIC PARTICIPATION MEANS, AND DOING WHAT IT TAKES TO GET 
IT 17 (2013). 
56. See Farina et al., supra note 13, at 414–15.  
57. Exec. Order No. 12,866 does advise agencies to consult with parties likely to benefit from or 
be burdened by a proposed rule, but it is neither enforceable nor requires any particular method of 
engagement. 
58. See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 












proceed. During advanced rule development the agency has made tentative 
decisions about the most promising courses of action and is in the process 
of choosing from among different alternatives and drafting a proposed rule.  
Both these stages of rule development have tremendous untapped 
potential for more fully democratizing the rulemaking process because 
agencies are still generally receptive to new information and relatively open 
minded about precisely how to proceed. Early rule development, in 
particular, may be when the public’s values and priorities can substantially 
influence the agency’s chosen direction. Informed public input could also 
help an agency choose from among the most viable alternatives during 
advanced rule development. Moreover, unaffiliated experts and citizens 
with situated knowledge could provide valuable information throughout the 
course of rule development as agencies seek to develop a better 
understanding of the relevant issues, develop the most promising regulatory 
solutions, and avoid unintended ambiguities or unanticipated problems with 
their proposals.59  
The importance of rule development has only been compounded in 
recent years as judicial and executive branch review have increased the 
incentives for agencies to “get things right” before promulgating an 
NPRM.60 Federal courts have held that the APA’s requirement of adequate 
notice is only satisfied “if the changes in the original plan ‘are in character 
with the original scheme,’ and the final rule is a ‘logical outgrowth’ of the 
notice and comments already given.”61 The “logical outgrowth” test creates 
a disincentive for agencies to make major changes to proposed rules because 
doing so may require a second round of notice and comment to avoid 
judicial invalidation. Similarly, the requirement that agencies provide a 
reasoned response to salient public comments creates an incentive for 
agencies to front-load their analytic efforts and puts them in a defensive 
posture during notice and comment, which may make them reluctant to 
make meaningful changes as a result of unanticipated comments. It may 
also induce agencies to weaken rather than strengthen their proposals to 
minimize the likelihood of a successful judicial challenge.62 Meanwhile, 
 
59. See Cynthia R. Farina, Dmitry Epstein, Josiah Heidt & Mary J. Newhart, Knowledge in the 
People: Rethinking “Value” in Public Rulemaking Participation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185, 1197 
(2012) (discussing the value of the situated knowledge of traditionally absent stakeholders “about 
impacts, ambiguities and gaps, enforceability, contributory causes, [and] unintended consequences” 
based on “their lived experience in the complex reality into which the proposed regulation would be 
introduced”). 
60. See West, supra note 15, at 582.  
61. Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).  
62. See Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 393–94 (2019); see also 
West, supra note 15, at 581 (recognizing that “courts may be less likely to entertain procedural 
challenges to [subtractive changes] because such actions do not tend to create legal standing in the same 
way as actions that extend the reach of government to previously unaffected interests”).  











economically significant proposals must undergo cost-benefit analysis and 
be approved by the White House Office of Management and Budget before 
they are published in the Federal Register.63 Agency officials may therefore 
be disinclined to make major changes in response to subsequent public 
comments. Other analytical requirements imposed by the White House or 
Congress on certain rulemaking, including obligations to consult with 
representatives of small businesses or other entities, could have similar 
effects.64  
The time and expense associated with the foregoing legal requirements 
are widely believed to have “ossified” the rulemaking process—meaning 
that agencies either forego legislative rulemaking in favor of adjudication 
or other less participatory policymaking forms, or that agencies tend to be 
closed minded and inflexible about making changes to their promulgated 
rules based on the public comments.65 As a result, E. Donald Elliott once 
observed that “[n]otice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation 
as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions—a highly stylized process 
for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life 
takes place in other venues.”66 Indeed, there is a widespread perception that 
agencies are unwilling to make major changes to their policies once they 
have published an NPRM.67 Even if this is due to the substantial thought 
and effort agencies have already devoted to a problem before publishing an 
NPRM,68 it places a premium on public engagement during agenda setting 
and rule development, when some of the most significant regulatory 
decisions are made.  
B. Limited Knowledge of Public Engagement Pre-NPRM 
Despite its undeniable importance, agenda setting has thus far received 
minimal attention from scholars of regulatory agencies and the 
administrative process. 69  The existing literature generally treats what 
 
63. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 370–72 (2014).  
64. For a list of statutes and executive orders requiring various forms of regulatory analysis, see 
Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 533 (2000). 
65. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 
ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995). 
66. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992).  
67. See West, supra note 15, at 582.  
68. See id. (recognizing that “sunk organizational costs . . . may reinforce agencies’ commitment 
to proposed rules”). Cf. Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(Leventhal, J., concurring) (“[O]ne cannot even conceive of an agency conducting a rulemaking 
proceeding unless it had delved into the subject sufficiently to become concerned that there was an evil 
or abuse that required regulatory response.”). 












happens before publication of the NPRM as a “black box”70 and suggests 
that such decisions are primarily influenced by political considerations and 
pressure from well-organized groups. An agency’s formal agenda includes 
the plans or activities identified in the semi-annual Unified Agenda of 
Regulatory and De-Regulatory Actions (Unified Agenda) and the agency’s 
annual Regulatory Plan. Agencies must prepare these documents under the 
supervision of the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) to comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act and 
Executive Order 12,866.71 While little is known about how agencies prepare 
and update these documents, it is widely understood that they are frequently 
incomplete and contain inaccuracies. 72  It is therefore useful to adopt a 
broader definition of agenda setting, which includes “all the choices and 
opportunities that both agency officials and other participants in the 
regulatory process have about what problems agencies emphasize and what 
alternatives they consider.”73 
Although empirical literature on regulatory agenda setting is still in its 
infancy, existing studies have found that most agency rules involve 
incremental changes to existing regulations rather than initial adoption of 
new regulatory demands. 74  These “updates” are often responsive to 
emergent problems, new technology, or changed circumstances and are 
typically initiated as a result of informal interactions between agency 
officials and regulated entities.75 In addition to industry influence, agency 
agendas are also informed by the priorities of the agency’s leadership and 
staff, as well as Congress, federal courts, and the White House. Indeed, 
presidents sometimes direct agencies to promulgate rules to address 
specified problems.76 Moreover, Congress frequently requires agencies to 
promulgate rules on designated subjects in its enabling legislation. 77 
Congress sometimes also requires agencies to engage in periodic 
 
70. See e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 25, at 152; West, supra note 15, at 583–84. 
71. See generally Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601; Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(b), 58 
Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); see also CURTIS W. COPELAND, THE UNIFIED AGENDA: PROPOSALS 
FOR REFORM 6 (2015).  
72. See COPELAND, supra note 71, at 11; Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Strategic 
Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 736 (2016).  
73. Coglianese & Walters, supra note 23, at 97. 
74. See Wendy Wagner, William West, Thomas McGarity & Lisa Peters, Dynamic Rulemaking, 
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183 (2017) (reporting that most agency rules revise or update existing regulations); 
William F. West & Connor Raso, Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda? Implications for Bureaucratic 
Responsiveness and Bureaucratic Control, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 495, 506 n.20 (2013) 
(reporting that eighty-five to ninety percent of rules fall into this category). 
75. See Coglianese & Walters, supra note 23, at 99; West & Raso, supra note 74, at 495–96. 
76. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2282–2320 (2001) 
(discussing the techniques used by President Clinton to direct administrative policymaking).  
77. Federal courts periodically enforce mandatory rulemaking obligations and associated 
statutory deadlines in successful litigation brought pursuant to the APA to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).  











“lookbacks” or retrospective reviews of previously enacted rules.78  For 
these reasons, existing studies have concluded that Congress plays a 
major—and perhaps the dominant role—in this process.79 
The APA does contemplate a role for the general public in agency agenda 
setting. Consistent with a longstanding constitutional tradition,80 it provides 
that “[e]ach agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for 
the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”81 The APA also requires 
agencies to respond to rulemaking petitions within a reasonable time82 and 
suggests that agencies must give reasoned explanations for denying such 
requests.83 Accordingly, unlike most of the methods of public engagement 
discussed in this Article, citizens have a legal right to file rulemaking 
petitions and effectively to compel agencies to respond to their requests in 
a reasoned fashion. Yet rulemaking petitions are only one available 
mechanism—and generally not the best one—for facilitating public 
engagement with an agency’s agenda. There are numerous other methods 
that agencies can use to engage the public in agenda setting.84 But there is 
virtually no scholarly literature on the best practices for using these different 
techniques.  
Similarly, the process for developing proposed rules has been almost 
completely neglected by the extant literature. 85  Based on a series of 
interviews with agency officials, information from the Unified Agenda, and 
a review of NPRMs issued over a two-month period, Bill West found more 
than a decade ago that agency officials routinely communicated with 
interested stakeholders during rule development, 86  that “[s]uch input is 
informal and idiosyncratic, . . . and [that] it generally lacks the assurances 
 
78. See Wagner et al., supra note 74, at 186 (discussing congressional and executive lookback 
requirements). 
79. See MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHO CONTROLS THE BUREAUCRACY? THE CASE OF 
AGENDA SETTING 19, 21 (2003); West & Raso, supra note 74, at 502, 504–05; see also Coglianese & 
Walters, supra note 23, at 105 (reviewing the literature and discussing Congress’s “highly influential” 
role in agency agenda setting). 
80. For discussions of the roots of the right to petition the government, see Maggie McKinley, 
Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1142–56 (2016), and JASON A. SCHWARTZ 
& RICHARD L. REVESZ, PETITIONS FOR RULEMAKING 7–8 (2014).  
81. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).  
82. See id. § 555(b).  
83. See id. § 555(e) (requiring prompt notice of the denial of a petition and “a brief statement of 
the grounds for denial”). Federal courts review denials of rulemaking petitions under an especially 
deferential version of the arbitrary and capricious test. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–
28 (2007); Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
84. See infra Part III.A (identifying the available methods).  
85. See Wendy Wagner, The Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative Process, 2013 
WIS. L. REV. 671, 687 (2013) (“Despite the potential importance of this rule development process as an 
additional access point, precious little is known about interest group engagement during this period.”); 
Wagner et al., supra note 25, at 113 (“As an empirical matter . . . little is known about the rule 
development phase.”); West, supra note 15, at 583.  












of inclusiveness and transparency that are afforded by notice-and-comment 
requirements.” 87  West suggested that public participation in rule 
development may be more common than is conventionally understood and 
that this activity could reinforce or magnify the imbalances of notice-and-
comment and potentially facilitate capture by regulated entities or other 
groups with preferred access to agency decision makers.88 
Wendy Wagner and her colleagues examined these possibilities in the 
leading empirical study of public participation in rule development to date.89 
They reviewed ninety EPA hazardous air pollutant rulemaking dockets and 
found that the agency regularly engaged in extensive communications with 
interested stakeholders during rule development. Moreover, such 
interactions were “almost completely monopolized by regulated parties.”90 
In particular, Wagner’s team found that “[i]ndustry had, on average, at least 
170 times more informal communications docketed with EPA during the 
pre-NPRM stage than public interest groups and more than ten times the 
informal contacts with EPA as compared with state regulators.”91 The gross 
disparity may have been exacerbated for these particular rules because they 
are required by statute to turn partly on the existing state of the industry’s 
technology 92—and EPA therefore plainly needed technical information 
from industry to develop its NPRMs. 93  Nonetheless, Wagner and her 
colleagues posited that public interest groups may be less likely to 
participate in rule development because they are unaware of what the 
agency is contemplating, lack requisite substantive knowledge, or cannot 
afford to devote limited resources to time-consuming work conducted 
largely behind the scenes.94 
Thus, the existing literature has done little to dispel the view that what 
happens before publication of an NPRM is a “black box” dominated by 
 
87. See id. 
88. See id. at 584–93.  
89. See Wagner et al., supra note 25. 
90. See id. at 125. 
91. See id.; see also Sidney Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Public Participation Without a Public: 
The Challenge for Administrative Policymaking, 78 MO. L. REV. 489, 501 (2013) (canvassing empirical 
research on the imbalanced nature of public participation in rulemaking and summarizing the results of 
this study); Wagner, supra note 85, at 687–88 (explaining that imbalanced participation in the 
rulemaking process begins during rule development and discussing the results of this study). 
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A) (requiring that emissions from existing plants should meet at 
least “the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the existing 
sources”); Wagner et al., supra note 25, at 120 (discussing this statutory requirement).  
93. See Wagner et al., supra note 25, at 111 (recognizing that regulated entities are “particularly 
privileged” in this context “because industry possesses a great deal of in-house information on industrial 
processes that EPA needs to write the rules”).  
94. See id. at 127–28; see also Wagner, supra note 85, at 688 (“Thus, although technically access 
to the agency during the pre-NPRM period might be free, because it involves extensive negotiation and 
repeat play—none with credit—it appears to attract only the richest stakeholders with the most 
immediate gains who can afford to participate.”).  











political considerations and pressure from well-organized groups. Indeed, it 
suggests that imbalances in participation are likely worse during agenda 
setting and rule development.95  
C. Obstacles to Enhancing Public Participation in Regulatory 
Governance 
There are significant obstacles to broad and diverse public engagement 
in regulatory decision-making of any kind, whether it involves agenda 
setting, rule development, or the notice-and-comment process itself. 
Sophisticated stakeholders have the motivation, resources, and capacity to 
provide agencies with the types of information they need and advance the 
kinds of arguments agencies are likely to find most persuasive. In contrast, 
ordinary citizens and many regulatory beneficiaries, smaller regulated 
entities, state, local, and tribal governments, and unaffiliated experts lack 
the resources for sustained engagement and face various other obstacles to 
participation.96  
First, members of the general public and less sophisticated stakeholders 
are often unaware of regulatory decision-making that may impact them and 
opportunities for public participation. 97  News coverage of agency 
rulemaking rarely mentions the opportunities for public comment, even 
though it is guaranteed by law. During an era of “Presidential 
Administration,”98 the media often portrays agency decision-making as an 
opaque, politically driven process in which presidential appointees choose 
regulatory initiatives based on the current administration’s priorities.  
Second, many individuals lack the motivation or incentive to become 
involved in regulatory decision-making, even when they are aware that their 
interests are at stake.99 Consistent with the logic of collective action, the 
interests of potential beneficiaries of regulatory action may be insufficient 
 
95. A recent case study of the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s interaction with the public 
during development of proposed rules to implement the Dodd-Frank Act found that organized groups 
representing the financial industry “collectively accounted for roughly 93% of all federal agency 
contacts on the Volcker Rule during the time period studied,” whereas public interest groups or other 
persons or organizations “accounted for only about 7%” of such contacts, and “the quality of federal 
agency contacts with financial industry representatives exceeds that of other contacts on several 
measures.” Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial 
Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 59 (2013). 
96. See CYNTHIA R. FARINA & MARY J. NEWHART, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, 
RULEMAKING 2.0: UNDERSTANDING AND GETTING BETTER PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 11–12 (2013) 
(discussing “barriers to effective . . . participation” by rulemaking novices).  
97. See Farina et al., supra note 53, at 389 (citing “[i]gnorance about the rulemaking process” 
and “[u]nawareness that rulemakings of interest are going on”); FARINA & NEWHART, supra note 96, at 
11. 
98. See generally Kagan, supra note 76. 












to justify the expenditure of time and attention on participating in the 
process, and absent stakeholders may assume that someone else will 
represent their interests.100 Indeed, not unreasonably, ordinary citizens may 
assume that agencies charged with pursuing the “public interest” will 
advocate on their behalf. Alternatively, they may believe that their 
participation will have no impact because the agency has already made up 
its mind. 
Third, even if absent stakeholders are aware of the opportunity to 
participate and motivated to become involved, they may not have the 
capacity to participate effectively. This is a significant obstacle even when 
the public is invited to participate in notice-and-comment rulemaking. Rules 
published for comment are typically lengthy, technically and legally 
complex, written for an audience with an advanced level of education,101 
and downright boring for most readers. Moreover, most members of the 
public do not know how to submit effective comments. Several scholars 
have noted that there is “a fundamental incongruence between the ways that 
‘insiders’ think and talk in rulemaking and the ways that novice commenters 
do.” 102  The “insiders” who regularly participate in rulemaking—i.e., 
executive branch officials, regulated industries, trade associations, and 
major advocacy organizations—form a “community of practice,” with 
“shared rhetoric, competencies, experiences, and expertise,” developed 
“over sustained interactions.”103 These insiders value objective, empirical 
evidence and quantitative data, presented in analytical, premise-argument-
conclusion reasoning, while unsophisticated stakeholders tend to offer 
“highly contextualized, experiential information, often communicated in the 
form of personal stories,”104 which insiders may not be prepared to hear. 
There is also a fundamental tension between popular conceptions of 
democratic participation that merely involve voting and expressions of pre-
political preferences, and the ideal of reasoned deliberation that underlies 
regulatory decision-making and is reflected in the nearly universal 
agreement of agency officials and administrative law scholars that the 
process is not—and should not be—“a plebiscite.”105 
 
100. See MANCUR L. OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); Coglianese, supra 
note 20, at 966 (noting collective action problems of public engagement). 
101. See, e.g., FARINA & NEWHART, supra note 96, at 12 (describing an NPRM written at a “late-
college/early-graduate school reading level”).  
102. Farina et al., supra note 59, at 1187.  
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Farina et al., supra note 11, at 131; Farina et al., supra note 53, at 429–30. But cf. Nina A. 
Mendelson, Should Mass Comments Count?, 2 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 173, 173 (2012) (noting 
that “[a]ll agree that public comments cannot serve as a plebiscite on the issue before the agency” but 
suggesting that agencies give greater consideration to public policy and value preferences in certain 
circumstances). 











Public interest and other advocacy groups could potentially overcome 
these barriers on behalf of individuals who cannot, but these groups have 
limited resources and sometimes make strategic decisions not to participate, 
even when their members may be rich sources of information, and they may 
not adequately convey the diversity of views or experiences of their 
constituents even when they do participate.106  
These barriers to broad public participation are reflected in the fact that 
most proposed rules generate very few public comments. While there has 
always been a paucity of public comments, the most recent data show that 
in fiscal year 2018 nearly one-third of proposed rules did not receive a single 
public comment; more than forty-five percent generated between one and 
ten public comments; and just over twelve percent received between eleven 
and one hundred public comments.107 Fewer than six percent of proposed 
rules generated more than one hundred public comments during the 2018 
fiscal year.108  In addition, organized groups generally participate in the 
rulemaking process at a substantially higher rate than individuals.109 While 
representatives of diffuse public interests, such as environmental or 
consumer groups, participate in some rulemaking, the process tends to be 
dominated by regulated entities, trade associations, and other business 
interests.110 There is also evidence to suggest that sophisticated parties have 
a greater influence on agency decision-making than ordinary citizens if and 
when the latter do participate.111 Finally, there are some studies showing 
 
106. See Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 
1300 (2016) (recognizing that interest groups vary in their operating procedures and the extent to which 
they involve and accurately speak for members). 
107. See OIRA Data (on file with authors).  
108. See id. At the same time, as discussed infra at note 114 and accompanying text, a small 
number of unusually salient rulemaking proposals have periodically generated an extremely high volume 
of public comments.  
109. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 1, at 189–214 (canvassing the empirical literature and 
recognizing that “in most instances participants in rulemaking will be groups, organizations, firms, and 
other governments,” and that individuals “will be less prominent than institutional participants”). 
110. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing 
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133 (2006) (reporting that about fifty-
seven percent of comments in a sample of rulemakings came from business interests); Wagner et al., 
supra note 25, at 128 (finding that eighty-one percent of comments on EPA’s proposed regulations of 
hazardous air pollutants came from business interests); see also Daniel E. Walters, Capturing the 
Regulatory Agenda: An Empirical Study of Agency Responsiveness to Rulemaking Petitions, 43 HARV. 
ENV’T L. REV. 175, 184 (2019) (canvassing the literature and reporting that “[o]n the whole, these 
studies have revealed striking evidence of business dominance of these procedural opportunities for 
participation”).  
111. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 
414 (2005) (reporting results of case studies showing that “the sophistication with which a comment is 
written seems to affect the probability that the agency will accept suggestions in that comment”); see 
also STEVEN J. BALLA, PUBLIC COMMENTING ON FEDERAL AGENCY REGULATIONS: RESEARCH ON 
CURRENT PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 













that the overwhelming majority of changes to proposed rules were made in 
response to comments from regulated entities or other business interests.112 
While the evidence is far from conclusive,113 it does suggest that business 
interests have greater influence in regulatory decision-making than ordinary 
citizens or public interest groups. At the very least, participation is often 
imbalanced and potentially unrepresentative of the views or perspectives 
held by members of the broader public. 
The picture of the regulatory process that emerges from these studies is 
one of agenda setting and rule development shaped by powerful political 
and corporate interests, followed by a notice-and-comment process in which 
the public is invited to participate but rarely does. The mass comments that 
are occasionally generated by advocacy groups in response to particularly 
salient proposals pose logistical problems and are not particularly useful to 
agencies.114 Citizens with situated knowledge of the regulatory issues based 
on their personal experiences and unaffiliated experts are routinely missing 
from the process, even when they have important information that could 
greatly improve the quality and legitimacy of the resulting rules.115 
As explained in the next Part, however, the situation is not quite so bleak. 
In conducting a comprehensive study of public engagement for the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), we identified 
 
Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects: ACUS, Rulemaking 2.0, and a Vision for Broader, 
More Informed, and More Transparent Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 87–88 (2013) (“Agencies 
tend to be more responsive to comments from regulated entities and to other ‘repeat players’ in the 
rulemaking process because they have the type of information that the agencies need to develop their 
rules and they are the entities that are most likely to sue if they are disappointed with the final rules.”).  
112. See Wagner, et al., supra note 25, at 130–31 (reporting that eighty-three percent of significant 
changes made to EPA’s air toxic emission standards “weakened them in some way, usually by 
eliminating some requirement that EPA originally suggested in the proposed rule”); Yackee & Yackee, 
supra note 110, at 135 (concluding that “agencies appear to alter final rules to suit the expressed desires 
of business commenters, but do not appear to alter rules to match the expressed preferences of other 
kinds of interests”).  
113. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 1, at 210–14 (canvassing the literature, recognizing the 
complexity of the issue, and identifying “variable factors”); BALLA, supra note 111, at 34 (reporting 
mixed evidence on “the extent to which comments filed by regulated entities and industry interests exert 
greater influence over agency decision-making than arguments and evidence submitted by consumers, 
environmentalists, and representatives of the public interest”); Walters, supra note 110, at 185–86 
(reporting that the empirical evidence is mixed “when it comes to assessing business influence, defined 
as an association between participation and policy change”).  
114. See Coglianese, supra note 20, at 958; HERZ, supra note 20, at 40–42. Although most agree 
that mass comments rarely provide information useful for fashioning effective rules, there is an ongoing 
debate regarding whether mass comments have any real value in rulemaking—and, relatedly, how 
agencies ideally should respond to them. Compare Farina et al., supra note 11, at 132–45 (claiming that 
mass comments have little value because they tend to be the product of relatively uninformed preferences 
rather than the type of reasoned deliberation that is supposed to characterize rulemaking), with 
Mendelson, supra note 105, at 176, 182–83 (pointing out that mass comments are typically relevant to 
agency decision-making in a broad sense, and arguing that agencies “should commit to acknowledging 
mass comments in the final rule document and to offering a brief answer” or potentially using those 
comments as a trigger for further deliberation). 
115. See Farina et al., supra note 59, at 1197. 











numerous efforts by agencies to engage the broader public in their work, 
including during the critical period before the publication of an NPRM. 
Nevertheless, these public engagement efforts are mostly unstructured and 
ad hoc. Moreover, they are not always designed to reach unaffiliated experts 
or traditionally absent stakeholders with situated knowledge of the 
regulatory issues based on “their lived experience[s].”116 Therefore, there is 
significant untapped potential for restructuring and improving public 
engagement with agency agenda setting and rule development and fostering 
meaningful participation by a broader and more diverse public. 
III. ACUS STUDY ON PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN RULEMAKING 
We recently conducted a major study for the Administrative Conference 
of the United States on public engagement in rulemaking, including agenda 
setting and rule development. ACUS has already produced important 
studies on related topics,117 and we sought to build on this work in two main 
ways. First, we focused on when and how agencies can encourage greater 
participation by traditionally absent stakeholders. Second, we sought to 
broaden the discussion of public participation in rulemaking beyond the 
notice-and-comment process to include regulatory agenda setting, early and 
advanced rule development, and retrospective review. We wanted to 
examine public engagement with rulemaking in a holistic way and take 
advantage of this rare opportunity to utilize ACUS’s contacts to open the 
black box of agenda setting and rule development.118 
We defined “public engagement” broadly to include efforts to enhance 
public understanding of and meaningful participation in the regulatory 
process. Public engagement can (1) merely “inform” or educate the public; 
(2) “consult” or obtain feedback from the public; (3) “involve” the public in 
decision-making by working directly with interested citizens and ensuring 
their concerns and aspirations are understood and considered; or (4) 
 
116. Id. 
117. See, e.g., CHERYL BLAKE & BLAKE EMERSON, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., PLAIN 
LANGUAGE IN REGULATORY DRAFTING (2017); Administrative Conference Recommendation 2017–2, 
Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Options for Public Engagement, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,039, 31,040 (July 
5, 2017); HERZ, supra note 20; Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013–5, Social Media in 
Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269, 76,269 (Dec. 17, 2013); Administrative Conference Recommendation 
2011–1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,789, 48,789 (Aug. 9, 2011); 
Administrative Conference Recommendation 2011–2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,789, 
48,791 (Aug. 9, 2011).  
118. See Krawiec, supra note 95, at 71 (explaining that despite its importance, “research on the 
preproposal stage of the rule development process has traditionally been impeded by a lack of 
information; Administrative Procedure Act docketing and other transparency requirements are generally 












“collaborate” or partner with the public in each aspect of the decision.119 
Efforts to involve or collaborate with the public tend to be more ongoing 
and deliberative in nature than efforts to inform or consult. 
With the assistance of ACUS and its federal agency contacts, we 
surveyed forty-three federal agencies to identify the institutional structures, 
procedures, and practices used to engage the public with their regulatory 
work. Based on the most promising responses, over the next year we used 
telephone interviews, public forums, and additional research to develop a 
rich understanding of how twenty-one federal agencies engage the public 
throughout the course of the regulatory process. They included a mix of 
large and small agencies, executive branch and independent agencies, and 
agencies that engage in rulemaking both frequently and infrequently.  
This Part presents the key findings from our study. First, there are many 
existing tools that agencies can use to engage absent stakeholders and 
unaffiliated experts in agenda setting and rule development. Second, 
unbeknownst to many scholars, agencies already use many of these existing 
tools. Third, each of these tools presents distinctive challenges, and agencies 
do not always use them successfully. Yet some agencies, such as the CFPB, 
have been more innovative. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, public 
engagement with agenda setting and rule development is unsystematic and 
ad hoc in nature. This raises concerns that agencies will undersupply 
participatory opportunities; important data, views, or arguments will remain 
missing from the regulatory process; and regulatory capture or unduly 
political decision-making could be facilitated by imbalanced participation 
in the early stages of the rulemaking process. Our findings therefore 
highlight both the promise and pitfalls of existing public engagement efforts 
and provide a foundation for the vision of democratizing rule development 
set forth in Part IV.  
A. Existing Tools for Early Public Engagement 
A regulatory agency that wants to ensure that it has access to all relevant 
information and views, and that it has heard from the full range of interested 
stakeholders, has an arsenal of tools to accomplish these goals. The first, 
which is explicitly authorized by the APA, is a petition for rulemaking, 
which can be used by any member of the public to seek the issuance, 
 
119. See IAP2 Spectrum, INT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. PARTICIPATION, https://iap2usa.org/resources/Do 
cuments/Core%20Values%20Awards/IAP2%20-%20Spectrum%20-%20stand%20alone%20document 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9CD-4N79] (articulating an influential “spectrum of public participation”). An 
agency could also theoretically “empower” participants by placing decision-making authority in the 
hands of the public. But this rarely occurs (and may be unlawful) since agencies are typically the 
authoritative rule makers under federal regulatory statutes.  











amendment, or repeal of a rule.120  Agencies are required to respond to 
rulemaking petitions in a reasonable time. 121  In addition, although not 
legally required, agencies may subject petitions for rulemaking to public 
notice and comment to assess the merits of the petitions and any 
alternatives. Indeed, as set forth in the following table, agencies can use 
various forms of notice and comment122 to solicit diverse perspectives on 
what should and should not be on the agency’s agenda and the potential 
regulatory alternatives: 
 
120. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). 
121. See id. § 555(b) (providing that “within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to 
conclude a matter presented to it”). The Supreme Court has never clarified the meaning of a “reasonable 
time” as set forth in § 555(b), however, see Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a 
Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-
Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1411 (2011), and courts rarely compel agencies to respond to 
petitions for rulemaking, see Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and 
Courts—Except When They're Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 96 (2007). The Administrative Conference 
has long urged agencies to publish procedural rules for the handling of petitions, which varies greatly 
among agencies, including establishing deadlines for responding to petitions. See Administrative 
Conference Recommendation 2014–6, Petitions for Rulemaking, 79 Fed. Reg. 75,114, 75,118 (Dec. 17, 
2014); Administrative Conference Recommendation 95–3, Review of Existing Agency Regulations, 60 
Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,109 (Aug. 18, 1995); Administrative Conference Recommendation 1986–6, 
Petitions for Rulemaking, 51 Fed. Reg. 46,988, 46,988–89 (Dec. 30, 1986). But their procedures remain 
all over the map. SCHWARTZ & REVESZ, supra note 80, at 70.  
122. Agencies refer to these kinds of early notice and comment proceedings by a variety of names, 
including Requests for Information (RFIs) and Notices of Inquiry (NOIs). RFIs are also very similar to, 
and in some cases, indistinguishable from Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRMs), which 
are published in the Federal Register to obtain comments on a potential rule that is under consideration 
by an agency. For purposes of this Article, we use the term “RFI” to refer to requests for comments early 
in the rule development process when the agency is still considering whether to engage in a rulemaking 
project and is just beginning to consider potential approaches to a problem. We use the term “ANPRM” 
to refer to requests for comments later in the rule development process when the agency has prepared a 













NOTICE AND COMMENT DURING AGENDA SETTING AND RULE 
DEVELOPMENT 
Subject of Public Comment Information Sought/Value 
Rulemaking Petitions Merits of petition/available 
alternatives 
Specific Regulatory Issues  
(RFIs and ANPRMs) 
Data, comments, or information on a 
designated issue to help agency 
decide whether a problem is worth 
addressing, and if so, how it might 
approach the issue 
Draft Submissions for Unified 
Agenda or Regulatory Plan 
Completeness and accuracy of 
documents/merits of agency’s 
priorities 
Agency’s Priorities Diverse perspectives on what should 
be agency’s top priorities 
In addition to these early forms of notice and comment, agencies can also 
use various informal means to gather information from traditionally absent 
stakeholders to inform their regulatory agendas. Such tools, which include 
hotlines, suggestion boxes, and procedures for lodging public complaints, 
typically make use of the agency’s website and are more open and 
accessible to rulemaking novices than the Federal Register or 
Regulations.gov. While it can be challenging to operate these tools 
effectively, 123  they can bring previously unknown or underappreciated 
problems to an agency’s attention and indicate whether those problems are 
widespread or warrant greater scrutiny. Agencies can also create databases 
of these public contacts and mine them to identify regulatory issues in need 
of attention. 
Of course, agencies may sometimes want to solicit data, comments, or 
other information from the public in person, where they can generate more 
interactive conversations and more easily pose follow-up questions than is 
generally possible through paper proceedings. There are a variety of 
methods for achieving these goals, which are briefly described in the 
following table: 
 
123. See MICHAEL SANT’AMBROGIO & GLEN STASZEWSKI, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., PUBLIC 
ENGAGEMENT WITH AGENCY RULEMAKING 57–61 (Nov. 19, 2018) (discussing these challenges).  
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Agencies may also use web-based outreach and social media to facilitate 
public engagement with rulemaking. While such efforts have been the 
 
124. Our definition of “enhanced deliberative methods” encompasses various established 
mechanisms for promoting principles of deliberative democracy, including Regulation Room, Citizen 
Juries, Citizen Advisory Committees, Citizen Assemblies, and Deliberative Polls. See supra notes 52–
56 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation Room); Bull, supra note 19, at 640–47 (advocating 
the use of citizen advisory committees in appropriate circumstances); CAROLYN J. LUKENSMEYER & 
LARS HASSELBLAD TORRES, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: A MANAGER’S 
GUIDE TO CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT 24–25 (2006) (describing the other listed methods). While these tools 
of deliberative democracy vary in their particulars, they commonly involve the creation of “mini-
publics” and (1) are more dialogic in nature than typical public meetings, (2) provide participants with 
balanced and objective briefing materials on the relevant issues, (3) include opportunities for small group 
discussions, (4) provide participants with opportunities to consider and respond to competing 
perspectives, (5) include opportunities to ask questions of outside experts or agency officials, (6) produce 
new information that can be incorporated into the decision-making process, and (7) result in a final 
report with findings and recommendations. If, however, a mini-public provides an agency with advice 
or recommendations as a group, this could implicate the requirements of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA). See REEVE T. BULL, THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT: ISSUES AND 
PROPOSED REFORMS 13–14 (2011) (describing the “group” requirement of the statute and explaining 
that “the case law has also created an amorphous exception to FACA that arises when an agency seeks 
advice from an assemblage of persons acting not as a formal group but as a collection of individuals”). 
Agencies should therefore consider using an advisory committee when seeking group advice. While the 
precise details are beyond the scope of this Article, it would be worthwhile for Congress to consider 
amendments to FACA that would facilitate less inhibited use of enhanced deliberative exercises.  











subject of extensive study,125 it is worth emphasizing that the potential of 
social media to facilitate public engagement is significantly greater during 
the early stages of rule development than during notice and comment 
because “the APA and other legal restrictions do not apply, and agencies 
are often seeking dispersed knowledge or answers to more open-ended 
questions that lend themselves to productive discussion through social 
media.”126 Moreover, the information load that must be surmounted for 
productive discussions is frequently much lower during the early stages of 
rule development. Social media could therefore be a useful tool for public 
outreach and education—simply informing stakeholders about an agency’s 
activities, notifying them of opportunities to participate, and providing 
instructional materials focusing on what information the agency seeks and 
how to participate effectively127—and also potentially for soliciting situated 
knowledge and other useful information during agenda setting and rule 
development from absent stakeholders and unaffiliated experts who do not 
traditionally participate in notice-and-comment proceedings. 128  While 
social media and other information communication technologies (ICTs) can 
also be used to facilitate interactive dialogue about an agency’s potential 
regulatory plans, this is by far the most challenging use of social media129 
and requires careful planning and implementation. 130  The e-rulemaking 
literature correctly recognizes that the use of social media is not like a field 
of dreams—if you build it, they will not necessarily come.131 One could add 
that even if they come, they will not necessarily provide information that 
agencies need. Nonetheless, as explained further below, if used effectively 
for informational and educational purposes, in some circumstances agencies 
may also be able to use ICTs to gather useful information and promote 
meaningful deliberation among discrete audiences during rule 
development.132 
 
125. See Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013–5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 
supra note 117, at 76,269; HERZ, supra note 20; see also Stephen M. Johnson, #Better Rules: The 
Appropriate Use of Social Media in Rulemaking, 44 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1379 (2017).  
126. Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013–5, Social Media in Rulemaking, supra 
note 117, at 76,270.  
127. The latter of which can increasingly be done through the production and distribution of 
instructional videos. See generally Elizabeth G. Porter & Kathryn A. Watts, Visual Rulemaking, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1183 (2016) (providing a comprehensive discussion and evaluation of the emerging use 
of visual materials in rulemaking).  
128. See Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013–5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 
supra note 117, at 76,271–72. 
129. For an extensive discussion of these challenges, see HERZ, supra note 20, at 21–28; see also 
Farina & Newhart, supra note 96, at 11–12 (discussing the primary barriers to meaningful public 
engagement in rulemaking).  
130. See Farina & Newhart, supra note 96, at 21–42 (discussing strategies for overcoming these 
challenges).  
131. See id. at 21.  












B. Federal Agencies Utilize Many of These Tools 
Over the course of our ACUS study, we spoke with numerous agency 
officials who described significant efforts to engage the public with their 
agenda setting and rule development activities. Indeed, federal agencies use 
many of the tools that are described in the preceding section, and some of 
those tools, including RFIs, listening sessions, and advisory committees, are 
used extensively by some agencies. Our ACUS report provides a host of 
concrete examples of federal agencies that have used the foregoing tools 
and discusses some of the best practices associated with each of those 
methods.133 Rather than repeating that information here, we believe that it 
is most useful for present purposes to provide a general summary of our 
most relevant findings and a few pertinent examples.  
While agencies’ practices and experiences with rulemaking petitions 
over the years can best be described as mixed,134 the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) have both 
received praise for their approach to this process,135 and ACUS has issued 
two sets of Recommendations on the best practices in this area.136 While 
some agencies do seek public comments on their rulemaking petitions, and 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has sought input from the public on what 
should be its top regulatory priorities,137 agencies have not established a 
regular practice of seeking public comments on drafts of their submissions 
for the Unified Agenda or Regulatory Plan. The use of RFIs and ANPRMs 
is, however, a common practice at several agencies, and agency officials 
repeatedly praised the value of these tools during our study.138 
The CFPB, which was generally the most innovative agency in our study, 
was at the forefront regarding the effective use of hotlines and public 
complaints during the Obama Administration.139 The Bureau’s Office of 
 
133. See generally SANT’AMBROGIO & STASZEWSKI, supra note 123.  
134. See generally William V. Luneburg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for Rulemaking: An 
Overview of Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommendations for Improvement, 1988 
WIS. L. REV. 1 (1988); SCHWARTZ & REVESZ, supra note 80.  
135. See SCHWARTZ & REVESZ, supra note 80, at 49–50 (reporting that the NRC makes a 
concerted effort to educate the public about the petitioning process, provides transparent updates on the 
status of pending petitions, and regularly communicates with petitioners about its informational needs); 
Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and Public Production 
of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 378–82 (2010) (describing FWS’s positive 
experience with the petition process under the Endangered Species Act).  
136. See Administrative Conference Recommendation 1986–6, Petitions for Rulemaking, supra 
note 121; Administrative Conference Recommendation 2014–6, Petitions for Rulemaking, supra note 
121, at 75,117. 
137. See Coglianese & Walters, supra note 23, at 115.  
138. See SANT’AMBROGIO & STASZEWSKI, supra note 123, at 50–52, 65, 78–80, 122–24.  
139. For an analysis of how the Trump administration has undermined the work of the Bureau, 
see Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection 
 











Consumer Education and Engagement managed a web-based hotline called 
“Tell Your Story,” which invited consumers to tell the agency about their 
“experiences with money and financial services, good and bad.”140  The 
website provided basic information about the Bureau, explained how 
“telling your story works,” gave examples of stories shared by other 
consumers, and noted that CFPB used this information to identify “trends 
and work to head off problems,” partly through its enforcement actions.141 
CFPB’s website also included a feature called “Ask CFPB,” which provided 
consumers with the opportunity to obtain “answers to frequently asked 
financial questions about student loans, credit cards, mortgages, credit 
scores and reporting, getting out of debt and more.”142 The CFPB received 
approximately 1.2 million consumer complaints via its website and an 
associated call center as of December 2017,143 and the Bureau was able to 
periodically mine this database using natural language processes. CFPB 
used the database mostly for rule development, and such data mining could 
also inform the Bureau’s agenda setting by identifying recurring problems 
and showing their magnitude or frequency.144 
Our study also found that federal agencies make extensive use of various 
types of live meetings during agenda setting and rule development. For 
example, the Forest Service, the NRC, and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) have all used listening sessions during the early stages of 
rule development to inform their decision-making.145 The NRC even has a 
designated group of employees trained as facilitators to organize and run 
these meetings.146 Numerous federal agencies use focus groups, primarily 
to ask questions about different approaches to consumer disclosure or 
product labelling, or to gauge public knowledge or attitudes regarding 
potential subjects of regulation, particularly when there may be widespread 
misinformation or confusion on the topic. For example, the National 
 
Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2543 (2019). Yet many of the systems developed to collect information from 
consumers have survived, creating a rich source of data for a future administration more interested in 
pursuing the Bureau’s mission. 
140. Your Money, Your Story, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.go 
v/your-story/ [https://perma.cc/78TF-2UR4].  
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Telephone Interview with Off. of Regulations, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Dec. 5, 2017) 
[hereinafter CFPB Interview] (on file with author).  
144. Id.  
145. Telephone Interview with Off. of the Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Agric. and Forest Serv. (Nov. 
17, 2017) [hereinafter Forest Service Interview] (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Nuclear 
Reg. Comm’n (Jan. 26, 2018) [hereinafter NRC Interview] (on file with author); DEBORAH DALTON & 
PHILLIP J. HARTER, EPA CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. CTR., BETTER DECISIONS THROUGH 
CONSULTATION AND COLLABORATION 6, 9–10 & app. V at 115 [hereinafter EPA, BETTER DECISIONS 
MANUAL] (describing EPA listening sessions).  












Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has conducted focus 
groups to address public fears about airbags,147 potential labels on tire fuel 
efficiency,148  and whether drivers understand advanced crash avoidance 
technologies.149 Similarly, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
conducted focus groups on food nutrition labelling,150  the usefulness of 
prescription drug labeling under current regulations,151  and the public’s 
views on genetically modified foods.152 Our study also found that many 
agencies use advisory committees during rule development to identify 
problems and obtain feedback on tentative solutions, including drafts of 
proposed rules. The Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), the NRC, and the CFPB all regularly 
consult with advisory committees for this type of advice before issuing 
NPRMs.153 
In contrast to the relatively widespread use of some methods of public 
engagement with rule development, federal agencies have made limited use 
of negotiated rulemaking in recent years. 154  Similarly, we found few 
examples of agencies using enhanced deliberative methods to generate 
feedback or advice from members of the general public during rule 
development.155 While negotiated rulemaking naturally has limited utility 
in policy areas with too many diverse interests at stake to be adequately 
represented by standard advocacy groups,156 one of the clearest lessons of 
our study is that agencies should seriously consider making greater use of 
enhanced deliberative methods in appropriate circumstances if they truly 
want to democratize rule development. 
 
147. See Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1366 (discussing this example).  
148. See Douglas A. Kysar, Commentary, Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on “Retaking 
Rationality Two Years Later”, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 43, 52 (2011).  
149. See Stephen P. Wood, Jesse Chang, Thomas Healy & John Wood, The Potential Regulatory 
Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1497 (2012).  
150. See Food Labeling: Format for Nutrition Label, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,058, 32,060 (July 20, 1992). 
151. See Erika Fisher Lietzan & Sarah E. Pitlyk, Thoughts on Preemption in the Wake of the 
Levine Decision, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 225, 250 n.141 (2010).  
152. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REPORT ON CONSUMER FOCUS GROUPS ON 
BIOTECHNOLOGY (2000). 
153. Telephone Interview with Dep’t of Energy (Jan. 20, 2018) [hereinafter DOE Interview] (on 
file with author); Advisory Committees of the FCC, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/advisory-com 
mittees-fcc [https://perma.cc/597K-R4XY]; NRC Survey Response; CFPB Interview, supra note 143.  
154. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) Waning of 
Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 996 (2008); Peter H. Schuck & Steven Kochevar, Reg 
Neg Redux: The Career of a Procedural Reform, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 417, 439 (2014).  
155. The best examples are the mediated online deliberations that Regulation Room conducted on 
ANPRMs. See infra note 157 and accompanying text; Cynthia Farina, Hoi Kong, Cheryl Blake, Mary 
Newhart & Nik Luka, Democratic Deliberation in the Wild: The McGill Online Design Studio and the 
Regulation Room Project, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527, 1545 (2014) (describing Regulation Room 
efforts regarding an ANPRM issued by the CFPB).  
156. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory 
Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1210 (1994).  











Of course, numerous federal agencies have used the internet and social 
media to engage with interested members of the public in recent years. For 
example, the Department of Transportation (DOT) has been a pioneer in the 
use of “status reports” and “effects reports,” which allow interested persons 
to keep track of the status of rulemaking initiatives that could affect them.157 
DOT also worked with Regulation Room to conduct interactive online 
deliberations regarding one of its ANPRMs.158 The FCC made extensive use 
of web-based outreach and public engagement early in the development of 
its National Broadband Plan.159 As explained further below, the CFPB was 
at the forefront of using the internet and social media to engage with the 
public during rule development during the Obama Administration. For 
example, the Bureau collaborated with Regulation Room to facilitate 
mediated online deliberations involving consumers regarding an ANPRM 
and engaged extensively with the public in developing new disclosure 
requirements for home mortgages. 160  These are just a few prominent 
examples of a larger and growing phenomenon—indeed, Elizabeth Porter 
and Kathryn Watts have recently documented a range of innovative ways in 
which many federal agencies are producing and distributing audiovisual 
materials focused on their rulemaking activities. 161  Those efforts have, 
however, mostly involved educating or informing the public about an 
agency’s activities rather than involving or collaborating with the public 
early in the process of developing a proposed rule.162 
C. Challenges and Successes 
Federal agencies periodically use many of the available tools for 
engaging with the public when they develop proposed rules. However, that 
does not mean that their public engagement efforts are always successful. 
Each of the available tools poses distinctive challenges, and agencies do not 
always use these tools effectively. Yet some agencies, including CFPB, 
 
157. Telephone Interview with Dep’t of Transp. (Jan. 12, 2018) [hereinafter DOT Interview] (on 
file with author).  
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159. See Jennifer A. Manner & Ronnie S. Cho, Broadband in America: Introduction to a New 
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have been more innovative and provide examples of best practices that 
could be more widely emulated. 
The same barriers that typically prevent rulemaking novices from 
participating effectively in notice-and-comment rulemaking also exist 
during agenda setting and rule development.163 Thus, ordinary citizens and 
less sophisticated stakeholders may not be aware that agencies are 
examining a problem or seeking public participation. Moreover, members 
of the general public may not be sufficiently motivated to participate even 
if relevant opportunities are brought to their attention. Finally, rulemaking 
novices may not have the capacity to participate effectively, even if they are 
aware of the available opportunities and motivated to become involved, 
because they do not understand the relevant issues or how they can be of 
assistance to the agency. While these barriers are often much easier to 
overcome during agenda setting and rule development than during the 
notice-and-comment stage, 164  agencies must still engage in substantial 
efforts to target potentially interested stakeholders and unaffiliated experts, 
persuade them to participate, and bring them up to speed on the relevant 
issues and the input the agency is seeking. 
It is also widely recognized that voluntary, self-selective forms of public 
participation “are frequently quite unrepresentative of any larger public,”165 
disproportionately utilized by wealthier, better educated, and otherwise 
more privileged citizens, as well as by citizens with relatively intense 
preferences or a large personal stake in the outcome. Thus, in the absence 
of the type of targeted outreach and educational efforts referenced above, 
one might predict that early forms of notice and comment during agenda 
setting and rule development—including RFIs, ANPRMs, and opportunities 
to comment on rulemaking petitions—will suffer from the same kind of 
imbalances that have been well documented in notice and comment 
rulemaking. The same may be true of listening sessions, enhanced 
deliberative methods such as Regulation Room, and other forms of public 
hearings that are open to the general public. 
While focus groups, advisory committees, and other enhanced 
deliberative methods are specifically designed to allow agencies to obtain 
relatively focused input or recommendations from targeted constituencies—
including unaffiliated experts, rulemaking novices with situated knowledge, 
or representative samples of ordinary citizens—each of these modes of 
public engagement raises its own set of challenges. Focus groups require 
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skilled facilitation and careful planning, participants may face a steep 
learning curve, and the views expressed in such interviews may not be 
representative of the general public (even in an informal sense).166 Federal 
advisory committees are heavily regulated by law, relatively time-
consuming and expensive to charter, and their composition may not truly be 
representative or balanced, despite FACA’s formal requirements. 167 
Enhanced deliberative methods, including citizen advisory committees, 
deliberative polls, and mediated online efforts to facilitate informed 
feedback from traditionally absent stakeholders such as Regulation Room, 
are undoubtedly resource intensive to design and implement, and they may 
not always yield substantial amounts of useful new information.168 Those 
methods are most likely to prove worthwhile when rulemaking novices “are 
likely to have useful information and . . . it is feasible to provide the . . . 
support necessary to elicit this information.”169 Agencies should therefore 
consider the “information load” or effort required to educate rulemaking 
novices so they can participate effectively.170 Moreover, agencies should 
consider using enhanced deliberative techniques “selectively—that is, . . . 
targeting only certain types of potential new participants or only certain 
issues in the rulemaking.” 171  Finally, agencies should favor enhanced 
deliberative methods when rulemaking proceedings are more rather than 
less important, more rather than less politically salient, and more rather than 
less likely to turn on the resolution of conflicting public values.  
Despite these challenges, our ACUS study found notable examples of 
innovative efforts by agencies to engage traditionally absent stakeholders in 
the process of developing their proposed rules. For example, the U.S. Forest 
Service conducted numerous public meetings and listening sessions as part 
of the process of developing its 2012 Planning Rule. 172  While these 
meetings were open to the public, the agency also conducted targeted 
outreach to important stakeholder communities, including users of the 
forests for recreational and economic purposes, Native American tribal 
communities, state and local government officials, and the scientific 
community.173 The Forest Service hired the U.S. Institute for Environmental 
Conflict Resolution (IECR) to design and facilitate its public engagement 
efforts. The public engagement efforts also included a science forum, four 
national roundtables and thirty-three regional roundtables, national and 
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regional public forums, national and regional tribal roundtables, tribal 
consultation meetings, Forest Service employee feedback, and comments 
posted to a Planning Rule blog. The agency considered all of the feedback 
it received through these efforts and used public input, science, and agency 
expertise to develop the 2012 Planning Rule.174  
As indicated above, the CFPB was at the forefront of public engagement 
with rule development during the Obama Administration. 175  When the 
Bureau was developing new disclosure requirements for home mortgages, 
it posted prototypes on its website and invited both consumers and industry 
to comment on the alternative forms, report any missing information,176 and 
assess their “usability and ease of implementation.”177 The Bureau received 
more than 27,000 text box comments and emails in response to the 
prototypes.178 In addition, the public could click on parts of the forms they 
“liked” or “disliked,” allowing the Bureau to create heat maps showing 
where readers focused their attention. The comments and heat maps helped 
the Bureau identify problems with the disclosure forms and develop 
solutions. The public thereby helped the CFPB further refine its proposed 
disclosure forms before publishing an NPRM. 
Merely posting material on a website is insufficient to ensure meaningful 
public participation, however. First, extensive outreach using multiple 
forms of social media was critical to CFPB’s success in obtaining robust 
public participation in the development of the mortgage disclosure rule.179 
Second, these online exercises were part of an iterative, multi-modal 
approach to public engagement. Early in the process, the CFPB held 
brainstorming sessions with a broad range of affected stakeholders to 
identify issues and potential solutions, conducted outreach on the reaction 
to prior disclosure proposals, hired experienced consultants to help with the 
design and testing, and held a scholarly symposium on how consumers 
make choices and the best practices for designing disclosures.180 Then, once 
the Bureau had developed two prototypes, it conducted five rounds of 
qualitative testing of each form using one-on-one interviews conducted in 
different parts of the country.181 After each round of testing, the Bureau 
evaluated the results, revised the forms, and tested the new forms during the 
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next round.182 At the same time, the Bureau used the web-based exercises 
to involve the broader public.183 
Internet and web-based exercises of this nature lend themselves 
particularly well to disclosure and labeling requirements because consumer 
preferences and reactions are directly relevant to their effectiveness.184 
Nevertheless, similar exercises could potentially be effective in a broader 
range of circumstances as one part of a comprehensive effort to democratize 
rule development. 
D. Public Engagement with Rule Development Is Unstructured and Ad 
Hoc 
Agencies have a host of tools to obtain information from missing 
stakeholders or unaffiliated experts and to understand the values, priorities, 
and concerns of ordinary citizens during agenda setting and rule 
development—when agencies are genuinely open to alternative courses of 
action. Yet aside from considering petitions for rulemaking, the tools of 
public engagement described above are legally optional and typically 
unstructured and ad hoc.185 While some agencies conduct carefully planned 
public engagement efforts regarding some rules some of the time, most 
agencies do not do so on a regular basis. 186  Thus, whether agency 
policymaking pre-NPRM involves public engagement efforts, and precisely 
what those efforts entail, has a reasonably good chance of being arbitrary. 
Agencies might not conduct public engagement that would substantially 
improve their decision-making because they overestimate its costs, they (or 
their political overseers) do not believe the public has relevant information 
to contribute, or they are unaware of which stakeholders are likely to be 
missing from the regulatory process or how to facilitate their effective 
participation. There are many incentives for agencies to undersupply public 
engagement or rely primarily on tools realistically accessible only to 
sophisticated stakeholders—such tools require fewer resources and less 
planning by agencies—which could result in political or regulatory capture 
of rule development. The unstructured and ad hoc nature of public 
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engagement pre-NPRM also means that truly public-spirited agencies are 
almost certainly foregoing many golden opportunities.  
To be sure, the proper level and kind of public engagement with 
rulemaking should vary from rule to rule, depending on the nature of the 
relevant information and the extent to which competing perspectives are 
adequately represented in the agency’s deliberations. Relatedly, public 
engagement efforts beyond notice and comment will at times be 
unnecessary or even counterproductive, such as when agencies have full 
information and complete authority to implement their statutory 
mandates.187 Moreover, even when relevant information or views would 
otherwise be missing, agencies do not need to hear from everyone. It is 
sufficient if all of the relevant information and competing views are 
adequately represented in the rulemaking process. 
Nevertheless, the ad hoc nature of much public engagement pre-NPRM 
raises concerns that agencies will undersupply participatory opportunities; 
important data, views, or arguments will remain missing from the decision-
making process; and agencies could be unduly driven by partisan politics or 
captured by well-organized special interests. The final Part of this Article 
explains that through careful planning, development of public engagement 
resources, and thoughtful outreach, agencies can enhance public 
engagement in agenda setting and rule development while retaining 
flexibility rationally to allocate limited resources based on the nature of the 
regulatory matters they confront.  
IV. DEMOCRATIZING RULE DEVELOPMENT 
Democratizing the federal rulemaking process will require sustained 
effort and significant resources, but this project is of fundamental 
importance at a time when the very future of American democracy seems 
increasingly fragile. This Part sets forth a blueprint for building on the tools 
described in Part III to more fully democratize agenda setting and rule 
development. It then explains why public engagement early in the 
rulemaking process offers a normatively more satisfying way to 
democratize rulemaking than the competing alternatives. 
A. Opening Up and Democratizing the Black Box 
Because the best approach to public engagement with rulemaking varies 
by agency and by rule, it would be counterproductive to mandate an overly 
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prescriptive set of uniform procedures on this subject. The legitimate need 
for customization, however, naturally raises the prospect that public 
engagement efforts will be inconsistent, uncoordinated, and ineffective. 
Avoiding this catch-22 requires institutionalizing reasoned decision-making 
regarding the appropriate scope and form of public participation for each 
regulatory initiative. This includes developing mechanisms that will 
encourage agencies to plan for public engagement early in the process, 
utilize available expertise, and devote sufficient resources to these efforts. 
Moreover, these structural reforms should encourage agencies to identify 
the missing information and stakeholders they need and choose the most 
effective means to engage them.  
1. Institutionalizing Planning for Public Engagement 
The best way for agencies to overcome the adhockery that currently 
afflicts public engagement with rule development is through early and 
systematic planning. This includes adopting general policies committing the 
agency to public engagement and providing a framework for involving the 
public in particular rulemaking initiatives. The EPA and the National Park 
Service have adopted public engagement policies of this nature.188 They 
provide guidance to agency managers and staff on specific steps that should 
be followed to promote effective public engagement and provide 
information about resources that are available to facilitate those efforts.  
The challenge is ensuring that such policies are consistently followed, 
particularly in administrations that place a low priority on civic engagement 
or when agencies face severe budgetary limitations. Agencies could, 
however, “pre-commit” to public engagement efforts by promulgating rules 
that at least presumptively require them to take certain action. For example, 
the DOE has used stakeholder engagement to adopt a “Process Rule” that 
sets forth the agency’s procedures for promulgating consumer appliance 
efficiency standards.189 Pursuant to the rule, DOE routinely issues RFIs, 
holds public workshops and otherwise solicits input from unaffiliated 
experts and consumers during the early stages of rule development, consults 
with an Advisory Committee on Appliance Energy Efficiency Standards 
throughout the rulemaking process, and issues an ANPRM to solicit 
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additional public comments before publishing an NPRM. DOE is required 
by statute to hold public hearings during the notice-and-comment stage,190 
and agency officials told us they routinely host public hearings at each stage 
of the rulemaking process.191 Other agencies could adopt similar process 
rules that presumptively require them to facilitate public engagement using 
certain tools at certain stages of the rulemaking process.  
Second, based on these general policies, agencies can develop specific 
plans for public participation in each rulemaking they undertake or seriously 
consider. Early and thoughtful planning is crucial to the success of public 
engagement,192 and there is no single approach that will work for every 
agency or every type of rule. There are, however, systematic ways to think 
about whether and how to conduct public engagement for any particular 
rulemaking.193 There are also resources that provide detailed guidance on 
how to conduct such planning effectively.194 A public engagement plan for 
a specific rulemaking should address (1) why the agency wants to engage 
with the public on the topic, (2) who the agency is trying to reach, (3) what 
type of information the agency is seeking, (4) how this information is likely 
to be obtained, (5) when these efforts should occur, and (6) what the agency 
will do with the information.195 
2. Developing and Deploying Public Engagement Expertise 
Although agencies typically have a great deal of subject-matter 
expertise, they do not necessarily know how to engage effectively with the 
public. Most agencies have also grown accustomed to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and may perceive little need to supplement existing legal 
requirements with other forms of public participation. Moreover, while 
agency officials generally need the technical information and data that can 
be provided by regulated entities and other sophisticated commenters, they 
frequently question whether ordinary citizens have anything of value to 
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contribute. 196  Even when agency officials recognize that absent 
stakeholders could provide the agency with useful information or novel 
views, agency officials may not be familiar with the best practices for 
generating or using this feedback.  
One way for agencies to develop and utilize expertise regarding public 
engagement is to hire experienced consultants with the training and 
experience to develop their public engagement policies and planning for 
specific rules. Agencies could also hire neutral conveners or facilitators to 
plan and implement at least some of their public engagement efforts. Many 
modes of public engagement described in Part III—including advisory 
committees, focus groups, listening sessions, public meetings, and 
enhanced deliberative methods—would likely be more effective if agencies 
utilized the services of trained professionals to design and manage the 
activities. Agencies may also want to secure the services of facilitators, 
mediators, or other persons trained in alternative dispute resolution when 
public engagement efforts involve particularly controversial issues or may 
generate substantial conflict. 
Of course, agencies can also develop the internal capacity to plan and 
carry out these activities. Agencies committed to public engagement would 
encourage employees to become knowledgeable about civic engagement 
techniques and principles. They would maintain interdisciplinary training 
materials and support opportunities to educate employees responsible for 
public involvement activities to understand and apply recognized best 
practices in the field. They would designate certain employees or establish 
new positions or units with responsibility for supporting and fostering 
efforts to engage a broad and diverse public in their rulemakings. These 
employees would be trained in procedures and practices aimed at involving 
rulemaking novices and unaffiliated experts in the regulatory process and 
serve as resources for rulemaking teams planning and executing public 
engagement efforts. A public engagement specialist might even be assigned 
to each rulemaking team. 
Finally, the federal government could take advantage of economies of 
scale to provide the requisite expertise in ways that may be more efficient 
and potentially even more effective. For example, Congress might establish 
and fund a new federal agency or division of an existing agency charged 
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with helping other agencies plan and carry out their public engagement 
efforts.197 
3. Designating Resources for Public Engagement Efforts 
Regardless of who is responsible for an agency’s public engagement 
efforts, democratizing rule development will be resource intensive. 
Although robust public engagement will not be necessary for every rule, 
agencies will need to make this determination in the first instance. 
Moreover, even relatively modest public engagement efforts, such as RFIs, 
listening sessions, ANPRMs, and the use of advisory committees, will 
demand scarce resources and prolong the rulemaking process. And using 
several of these tools in combination along with enhanced deliberative 
forums would require a serious commitment of time, resources, and energy. 
Public engagement efforts of this nature should therefore not be undertaken 
lightly.198 
The need to devote sufficient resources to public engagement efforts 
reinforces the importance of careful planning to ascertain if meaningful 
public participation is possible with the resources available and whether the 
agency is committed to the effort. 199  Professors Farina and Newhart 
emphasize that facilitating “new participation that adds value to the 
rulemaking process requires significant commitments from the agency—
commitments of human, as well as technological [and financial], 
resources.”200  
Nevertheless, it is important to keep the resources necessary for effective 
public engagement in perspective. Relatively modest efforts to enhance 
public engagement could frequently yield substantial benefits at relatively 
little cost. For example, an extensive study for ACUS concluded that 
considering the amount of quality information they generated, federal 
advisory committees enable regulatory agencies “to solicit what is 
tantamount to free advice.”201 Based on our interviews, a similar conclusion 
would often apply to RFIs, listening sessions, some web-based forms of 
outreach, and perhaps even ANPRMs. In any event, when one considers that 
significant and major legislative rules by definition have effects of more 
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than $100 million on the national economy, the costs associated with even 
the most robust forms of public engagement will usually be just a drop in 
the bucket. Given the legitimacy and effectiveness such efforts would lend 
to agency decision-making, enhanced public engagement will often be 
worth the costs.  
4. Identifying Absent Stakeholders and Information 
Our vision for democratizing rule development seeks to promote 
principles of deliberative rather than direct democracy. It is therefore 
concerned primarily with the quality of public engagement as opposed to its 
quantity. Legitimate collective decisions in a deliberative democracy should 
be based on the best available information and respond in a reasoned fashion 
to all of the relevant interests and perspectives. That is why the imbalanced 
nature of public participation in notice and comment is problematic, and 
special efforts are often needed to ensure that missing stakeholders, 
unaffiliated experts, and ordinary citizens are heard in the process. Agencies 
do not need every interested person to participate, but they do need to ensure 
that all of the relevant interests and perspectives are represented. 
Thus, agencies must think systematically about which individuals or 
groups will be benefitted or burdened by a potential rule, whether their 
interests and perspectives are likely to be represented, and what types of 
information or views they could potentially contribute. Sometimes this 
analysis will be straightforward—for example, rules designed to protect 
consumers should consider their experiences and views; rules that affect the 
trucking industry should consider the experiences and perspectives of truck 
drivers and small trucking companies; and rules designed to address the 
needs of disabled travelers should be informed by members of that group.202 
But in other cases it may be difficult to identify all the regulatory 
beneficiaries of a rule or how it would affect the interests of state, local, or 
tribal governments, other small entities, or members of the general public. 
While an agency’s experience with existing regulatory analysis 
requirements and prior public engagement efforts provide a sound basis for 
beginning this process, agencies will generally need to undertake 
affirmative efforts to identify, solicit, and obtain information or views from 
stakeholders who do not typically participate.  
Enhanced public engagement efforts should focus primarily on three 
distinct categories of traditionally absent or underrepresented 
stakeholders—unaffiliated experts, citizens with situated knowledge of the 
regulatory context, and ordinary citizens. These stakeholders typically 
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possess different kinds of information or views that could be relevant to 
rulemaking initiatives. Unaffiliated experts possess specialized knowledge, 
technical information, or related skills, and they can often provide agencies 
with relevant data or neutral expertise on regulatory issues that are beyond 
the competence of laypeople. The prototypical example is a researcher at a 
university. Citizens with situated knowledge have practical experience 
based on their “first-hand exposure to the problems, circumstances, or 
solutions involved in the proposed regulation,”203 and they may be able to 
raise issues the agency has not considered, identify ambiguities or 
unanticipated problems, or perhaps reframe the relevant questions or 
highlight the potentially competing values at stake.204 Ordinary citizens are 
most likely to convey broad support for or opposition to a rulemaking 
initiative or recommend strengthening or relaxing a regulatory standard 
based on value-laden, pre-political policy preferences or priorities.205 
The ability of rulemaking novices to provide agencies with useful 
information or views of any kind, however, will also be a function of the 
relevant “information load”—i.e., the time, effort, and difficulty that would 
be required to get new participants up to speed on the relevant issues so they 
can meaningfully comment on them.206 The information load is typically 
lower for rulemaking novices during agenda setting and rule development 
than during notice-and-comment rulemaking. That said, the information 
load is typically lowest for unaffiliated experts who already have relevant 
substantive expertise and tend to be highly educated and capable of 
understanding complex materials. The information load is generally 
moderate for individuals with situated knowledge of the subject of 
regulation but will vary from rule to rule and at different stages of the 
rulemaking process. The information load is typically greatest for ordinary 
citizens who tend to be uninformed about the rulemaking process and may 
struggle with the legal and technical complexity of many regulatory issues.  
Public engagement with rulemaking thus requires efforts to identify 
missing information and views and the participants most likely to fill these 
gaps. Agencies with limited resources should also determine when the 
information or views that various types of absent stakeholders are likely to 
bring to the table would be most useful and estimate the information load 
associated with efforts to generate the desired feedback. Targeted efforts to 
secure increased participation by unaffiliated experts may provide agencies 
with the greatest bang for their buck given their lower information loads. 
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Meanwhile, agencies should seriously consider cost-effective ways to 
facilitate meaningful participation from targeted stakeholders with situated 
knowledge at various stages of the rulemaking process when the 
information load is manageable. It is generally likely to be lowest early in 
the rulemaking process when the agency is trying to determine whether to 
place an item on its agenda and considering different approaches.  
Finally, while serious efforts to involve the general public in rulemaking 
will often be unnecessary or cost-prohibitive, it may be useful for agencies 
to undertake the work necessary to ascertain the values and priorities of a 
sufficiently well-informed and representative group of ordinary citizens 
during agenda setting and the early development of sufficiently important 
or controversial rules—or when an NPRM generates a genuine groundswell 
of unanticipated grassroots opposition.207 It is at those stages that the values, 
policy preferences, and priorities of a representative cross-section of the 
general public can be most salient and useful. The following chart illustrates 
this general conception of public participation in rulemaking: 
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5. Conducting Targeted Outreach 
Once agencies have identified the stakeholders and information they 
need in a given matter, agencies must conduct outreach to encourage them 
to participate and supply their information or views. This requires engaging 
in communication that is likely to reach the relevant stakeholders, which 
emphasizes that the agency seeks their input, clearly explains how to 
participate, and persuades the targeted audiences that participating is worth 
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their effort.208 An outreach plan should be designed “to put information 
about the rulemaking in places where members of the targeted participant 
groups are likely to come across it.”209 This means that the plan should be 
“tailored to the specific rule and to the targeted types of participants.”210 It 
should include direct communication with targeted stakeholders, where 
possible, as well as the proactive use of social and conventional media and 
efforts to communicate with organized groups that are likely to forward 
messages to members of the targeted audiences. An effective outreach plan 
also requires conscious efforts to develop messages that will persuade 
members of the targeted audiences to participate by clearly and concretely 
explaining how the agency’s initiative could positively or negatively affect 
their interests.211 
Structural or institutional reforms may be necessary to help agencies 
identify, reach, and involve absent stakeholders in rule development on a 
regular basis. The simplest strategy would be for agencies to include public 
engagement experts on their rulemaking teams tasked with these 
responsibilities. Agencies could hire outside consultants or provide training 
for agency staff who could be available to perform this function regularly. 
Agencies would also need to ensure that their rulemaking teams have the 
technical support necessary to help them use the best available information 
technology to carry out their outreach activities. If Congress established and 
funded a new federal office to help agencies plan their public engagement 
efforts, this entity could also be responsible for facilitating effective 
outreach.212 
Regardless of precisely who is responsible for outreach, information 
communication technologies (ICTs) will almost certainly play an 
increasingly prominent role. Beth Simone Noveck, who served as the first 
United States Deputy Chief Technology Officer and director of the White 
House Open Government Initiative under President Obama, claims that “it 
may soon become easy to identify with precision who knows what and 
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match them to opportunities to serve.”213  Noveck recognizes that while 
profiling consumers based on their online behavior “has become part of 
everyday commerce, these applications of user segmentation and targeting 
make some people uncomfortable.”214 Nonetheless, she argues that “if we 
can develop the algorithms and platforms to target consumers, can we not 
also target citizens for the far worthier purpose of undertaking public 
service?”215 The enhanced ability to identify people with nontraditional, 
experiential forms of expertise would also allow agencies to develop 
databases of citizens with special expertise on a broad and diverse range of 
subjects.216 Noveck claims that the development of a searchable “directory 
of directories” or “Brain Trust” of civic knowledge would allow agencies to 
match the supply of available expertise with their specific demands in any 
particular case.217 This information and related capacity has the potential to 
greatly improve the effectiveness of an agency’s outreach efforts and 
substantially enhance participatory democracy in general.218 While agencies 
have always conducted similar forms of outreach with rolodexes and other 
older forms of communication, ICTs open up the possibility for more 
creative and effective forms of outreach that can reach a broader range of 
participants based on their knowledge, experience, skills, and interests. In 
this way, technological innovations could play a substantial role in 
democratizing rule development. 
6. Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Novices 
Democratizing rule development also requires agencies to ensure that the 
feedback they receive is sufficiently well-informed and reflective, and that 
participatory opportunities for rulemaking novices are meaningful for both 
agencies and citizens. Agencies can secure meaningful participation by 
rulemaking novices, in part, by using modes of public engagement that are 
well-suited for the tasks at hand. If, for example, agencies merely want to 
begin gathering information about a potential regulatory problem, they 
could issue an RFI and engage in outreach to secure participation from 
unaffiliated experts and stakeholders with relevant situated knowledge. If, 
however, the agency wants ongoing advice from a more deliberative body 
of experts or ordinary citizens, the agency should consider using a federal 
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advisory committee. The agency could also conduct a deliberative poll if it 
wanted to know what the general public would think about a problem if they 
had an opportunity to engage in reasoned deliberation about the issue.219 An 
agency’s planning process should therefore identify which modes of public 
engagement make sense in any particular rulemaking proceeding and 
determine how and when those efforts will be conducted.  
Regardless of which methods are used, participants must understand how 
to provide informed and reflective feedback on the relevant issues. Precisely 
what this entails will vary based on the circumstances (and should, once 
again, be addressed in the planning process), but rulemaking novices will 
generally need to be educated in two distinct ways. First, they will often 
need information about how to participate effectively in a given proceeding. 
Agencies have, for example, increasingly produced instructional materials 
that provide readily accessible information for rulemaking novices 
regarding how to prepare effective public comments or what should be 
included in a rulemaking petition. 220  An important component of 
democratizing rule development would be the creation of instructional 
materials to teach rulemaking novices about the full range of opportunities 
to participate in agency decision-making and how to participate effectively 
in each mode of engagement.221  
Second, rulemaking novices will also routinely need information about 
the substance of a regulatory problem, the range of options available to the 
agency, the agency’s tentative plans (if any), and the precise nature of the 
information or feedback the agency seeks. Agencies must provide novices 
with background information that addresses these issues in a clear, 
balanced, and accessible manner, so that potential participants can provide 
focused, relevant, and useful input. The difficulty of getting rulemaking 
novices up to speed on relevant issues will vary depending on the nature of 
the regulatory problem, the type of information or feedback the agency 
seeks, the methods of public engagement the agency uses, and the 
composition of the targeted audiences for the agency’s public engagement 
efforts, among other factors. But the information provided to these 
participants must generally be “radically shorter and simpler” than a typical 
NPRM. 222  The likelihood of securing meaningful public participation 
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decreases as the information load associated with successfully engaging 
particular types of commenters on a regulatory problem grows.223 The best 
way to overcome this challenge may be for agencies to focus their public 
engagement efforts on specific issues or questions for which the information 
load is lower and the targeted audience can provide the data, views, or 
arguments the agency needs. In addition, it will generally be easier to 
facilitate meaningful public participation by unaffiliated experts who 
already have the training and education necessary to understand complex 
regulatory problems in their fields of study.  
Finally, agencies could significantly increase their use of deliberative 
modes of public engagement, which are designed to provide participants 
with relevant background information and to generate thoughtful 
recommendations after the participants have engaged in a process of 
reasoned deliberation that considers competing views and perspectives. 
While enhanced deliberative methods are relatively time-consuming and 
expensive, they could be streamlined to focus on discrete issues or 
questions. By creating the conditions necessary for participants to engage in 
reasoned deliberation on which courses of action will promote the public 
good, such methods provide the greatest hope of creating opportunities for 
truly meaningful participation by rulemaking novices.  
7. Providing Public Interest Representation 
At the end of the day, there may be interests or perspectives that are not 
adequately represented in a given rulemaking, despite an agency’s best 
efforts to reach them. Therefore, agencies may want to consider appointing 
ombudspersons (or similar individuals or entities) to represent the concerns 
of absent stakeholders, particularly where collective action problems are 
likely to prove most intractable or the relevant information loads are 
overwhelming. The National Taxpayer Advocate established by Congress 
to represent the interests of low-income taxpayers with the IRS is widely 
viewed as a successful example of this model.224 Public interest advocates 
of this nature can improve the quality of information that is available to 
agencies and help to prevent regulatory capture.225 These representatives 
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can be formally established by Congress, the White House, or by agencies 
themselves, and they can be part of a larger office that is charged with 
promoting good government in ways that may be less central to the agency’s 
substantive statutory mission.226 Of course, such offices must be designed 
with care to ensure that they have an appropriate degree of influence and 
stay true to their assigned functions. 227  Nevertheless, designated 
representatives of missing stakeholders could contribute to the 
democratization of rule development by providing agencies with a more 
complete and well-balanced array of views and perspectives. 
B. Benefits of Democratizing Rule Development 
Enhancing public engagement with agenda setting and rule development 
will lend greater democratic accountability and legitimacy to policymaking 
than other remedies for the administrative state’s “democracy deficit.”228 In 
addition, it will provide agencies with more useful and timelier information, 
improve notice and comment itself, provide a more thorough rulemaking 
record for judicial review, and foster a more robust culture of civic 
participation.  
1. More Democratic than Alternative Models 
Robust public engagement with rule development is a more effective 
means of democratizing rulemaking than strong presidential control of 
agency discretion, which some advocate as a cure-all for rulemaking’s 
democracy deficit.229 Indeed, it enhances democracy in a way the President 
alone cannot. Agencies are not designed to be electorally accountable, and 
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direct democracy is completely alien to our federal representative system.230 
Agencies’ lack of electoral accountability is not problematic, however, if 
we conceive of democratic accountability more broadly than merely 
standing for periodic elections. Democratic accountability also requires 
government officials to render a justifiable account of what they are doing 
on behalf of the public based on the “republican idea [that] the business of 
government is public business.”231 It imposes on agencies an obligation to 
render an account to the public of what they are doing and to “[do] so in a 
form that can be understood by the [public].”232 While elected officials are 
ultimately accountable to their constituents through elections, the absence 
of electoral controls for agencies calls for heightened accountability on their 
part to individuals and groups by considering their interests and 
perspectives, responding to them in a deliberative fashion, and by giving 
justifications for regulatory decisions that could reasonably be accepted by 
citizens with fundamentally competing views.233 We might take this a step 
further and say that agencies have an obligation not only to render an 
account of their thinking in a form that could reasonably be understood and 
accepted but also in a way that gives the public a meaningful opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process.234  
Therefore, robust public engagement with policy development will lend 
agencies more democratic legitimacy than the President can provide 
indirectly through his own electoral accountability. To be sure, the President 
has an important role to play in shaping policy. But the President cannot 
possibly supervise in any meaningful way any but a few high-stakes 
rulemaking initiatives. Moreover, the President is not a proxy for the 
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electorate, let alone a majority of citizens. Presidents frequently stray from 
their campaign promises, and there is little electoral accountability for 
presidents in their second terms, particularly in a political system 
characterized by weak party control. Presidents also make far too many 
decisions over an extended period for elections to be an effective 
accountability mechanism, and most voters are unaware of most of the 
President’s decisions. Furthermore, many presidents are elected by less than 
a majority of voters, and a majority of citizens do not even vote in 
presidential elections. Put simply, “we the people” is a much broader group 
than “we the voters,” much less “the President’s electoral base.” Thus, 
whatever mandate a president might claim is derived from a small slice of 
the public.  
More importantly, even if the President were able to claim the support 
of a majority of citizens, democracy would mean little if an electoral victory 
entitled the President to run roughshod over minority interests. Our 
republican system rejects the idea that government policy flows directly 
from elections. Although the Framers conceived the government as an agent 
of the people, they rejected the idea that elected representatives should be 
bound by the electoral mandates of their constituents. 235  Nor did they 
believe elections entitled elected representatives to act arbitrarily. Rather, 
the Framers envisioned a deliberative government decision-making process, 
allowing judgment and reason to prevail over private interests, resulting in 
legislation for the public good.236 Elected officials could not merely cite the 
desires of their constituents to justify their positions. Rather they would 
need to convince both their fellow representatives and the people of the 
wisdom of their views. Such political deliberation about the public good 
would, in turn, improve the public’s own understanding of the best 
government policies to pursue. 237  This was not simply because 
representatives would be “better” citizens but because they would have the 
time and information to engage in “collective reasoning about common 
concerns.”238 At the same time, political debate would prompt input from 
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political constituencies as issues and policies came to the fore, creating a 
deliberative dialectic between the people and their representatives.239 
To be sure, the Framers imagined deliberation over government policy 
centered in the national legislature. But as the nation has grown in size and 
complexity, important policy decisions are increasingly made by federal 
agencies. It would be a poor form of democracy indeed that ignored the 
people when the locus of policy-making shifts from Congress to federal 
agencies. Whatever influence presidents should exercise over agency 
discretion, and whatever electoral mandate they might claim, our founding 
principles require the government to engage the public in an ongoing 
deliberative process of policy-making based on reason giving. Enhancing 
public engagement in agenda setting and rule development furthers this 
essential goal.  
Meaningful public engagement in agenda setting and rule development 
is also likely to more fully democratize rulemaking than merely moving 
rulemaking online or encouraging participation after the publication of an 
NPRM. To be sure, the arrival of e-rulemaking dockets has made it 
substantially easier for interested members of the public to see what an 
agency is doing and to comment on regulatory proposals. Regulations.gov 
replaced scores of dispersed electronic and paper-based docket systems 
maintained by each agency with a single, centralized web-based source for 
all federal rulemaking dockets. Before the advent of e-rulemaking, most 
people had to go to a library that carried a hard copy of the Federal Register 
to learn about an agency’s rulemaking activity before the publication of a 
final rule.240 The library might not receive the Federal Register in a timely 
manner given the relatively brief window for public comments, and 
typically other public comments could only be accessed in the docket rooms 
maintained by the agency in Washington, D.C.241 
Nevertheless, Regulations.gov does not appear to have led to any 
meaningful role by citizens in shaping the rules which affect us all.242 As 
one commissioned study puts it, the website “continues to reflect an 
‘insider’ perspective—i.e., the viewpoint of someone familiar with 
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rulemaking and the agencies that conduct it.”243 If you know what you are 
looking for and have experience commenting in rulemakings, the website 
has most of what you need. Otherwise, it does little to overcome the barriers 
to participating in rulemaking for novices who manage to become aware of 
the rulemaking and are sufficiently interested to make it this far. This is due 
in part to the challenges of the underlying rulemaking process and in part to 
the technical shortcomings of the website.244 Given the density of regulatory 
materials and the difficulty of navigating Regulations.gov, visitors are likely 
to become discouraged, disengaged, or just throw up their hands and select 
“Comment Now!” without sufficiently understanding the issues involved or 
what information they possess that would be helpful to the agency. Thus, it 
should not be surprising that many of the comments submitted by the 
general public merely voice approval or disapproval of the agency’s general 
proposal or performance, address themselves to issues outside the agency’s 
jurisdiction or the scope of the NPRM, or otherwise do not provide the 
agency with any actionable information. Indeed, it would be surprising if 
the public provided any other types of comments when confronted with 
lengthy and complex NPRMs lacking focused questions. 
Therefore, enhancing public engagement with agency agenda setting and 
rule development offers a more effective means of democratizing 
rulemaking than merely moving the rulemaking process online. 
2. More Timely and Useful Information 
Democratizing rule development would also provide agencies with more 
timely and useful information from absent stakeholders. While federal 
agencies are often reluctant to make major changes to proposed rules after 
they have published an NPRM, and the information provided by ordinary 
citizens may come too late to have value, public engagement with agenda 
setting and rule development is more likely to provide agencies with useful 
information when they are most receptive to it. This is partly because 
agencies are typically more open minded about competing courses of action 
before they have gone through the work required to publish an NPRM fully 
vetted by the agency’s politically-appointed leadership and OIRA and partly 
because the information load that must be satisfied for rulemaking novices 
to make positive contributions is frequently lower during earlier stages of 
the process. In addition, the situated knowledge or priorities, preferences, 
and values that missing stakeholders or the general public ordinarily bring 
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to the table are often better addressed or resolved during agenda setting and 
rule development.  
To be truly valuable, however, the priorities, preferences, and values of 
ordinary citizens must be well informed, carefully considered, and based on 
reliable information. This will generally only be the case when agencies 
engage in proactive efforts to facilitate reasoned deliberation on the issues 
by a balanced cross-section of the relevant stakeholders or the general 
public. Unlike notice-and-comment rulemaking, the tools available to 
facilitate public participation in rule development—and, in particular, the 
methods for involving or collaborating with the public, such as advisory 
committees, focus groups, and enhanced deliberative methods—can 
provide agencies with information about what the general public would 
think about a problem if they had an opportunity to engage in reasoned 
deliberation about the issues. 245  Moreover, virtually all of the tools 
described in Part III can be used to generate situated knowledge or neutral 
expertise from missing stakeholders or unaffiliated experts who do not 
typically participate in notice and comment. Accordingly, robust public 
engagement in agenda setting and rule development can provide agencies 
with more timely and useful information from a broader mix of stakeholders 
than notice and comment alone.  
3. Supplementing Notice and Comment and Improving Judicial Review 
Democratizing rule development would improve the legitimacy of 
regulatory decision-making and provide agencies with more timely and 
useful information. But our proposed reforms could also have beneficial 
spillover effects that improve the operation of notice and comment. In 
particular, agencies could use the information generated by their public 
engagement efforts during agenda setting and rule development, as well as 
the tools available to facilitate public engagement during those early stages, 
to supplement notice and comment and help address the challenges of mass 
comments. 
One way that democratizing rule development could improve notice and 
comment would be for agencies to incorporate summaries of their public 
engagement efforts into the preambles of their proposed and final rules. 
Because public engagement with rule development is typically optional, 
agencies are only required to discuss their public engagement efforts and 
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provide summaries of what occurred when the data, views, or arguments 
generated from them form the basis for a proposed rule.246 While agencies 
thus have tremendous discretion regarding the contents of the administrative 
record and how they write their preambles, there may be significant 
advantages to summarizing and documenting the results of their public 
engagement efforts. For starters, an agency could demonstrate that a 
proposed rule was the result of careful study and reasoned deliberation by 
describing the scope of its civic engagement efforts and explaining how 
informed public participation influenced the proposal’s development. This 
information would also show participants and other members of the public 
that the agency took their feedback seriously. In addition to explaining why 
it chose a particular path, the agency could also explain why it rejected the 
concerns of critics with competing priorities, values, or preferences of the 
type that are typically expressed in mass comments. 
The ongoing debate among some commentators regarding the proper 
treatment of mass comments247 tends to gloss over the fact that rulemaking 
is a multi-stage process and that notice and comment only occurs after 
agencies have already devoted substantial attention to the basic issues at 
stake. This means that the simple statements of viewpoint, value, or 
preference that tend to be reflected in mass comments will generally have 
already been considered and resolved by the agency when it established its 
agenda and developed its proposed rule. Agencies should not necessarily be 
required to redo all this work in response to mass comments when they issue 
their final rules. While agencies are often criticized for their inflexibility 
during notice and comment, a certain amount of path dependence is a natural 
and not entirely undesirable element of the rulemaking process.  
This dose of realism, however, puts a premium on the importance of 
agencies conducting meaningful public engagement before publication of 
an NPRM, when their highest priorities are established and basic value 
questions are resolved. If agencies provide a reasoned explanation for 
pursuing a proposed rule and address value questions in the course of 
developing a rule proposal, they should generally be able to rely on this 
information as an adequate response to mass comments. This approach 
would create incentives for agencies to connect their early public 
engagement efforts with the rules that emerge from those efforts and could 
potentially give agencies credit during judicial review for explaining how 
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public engagement influenced their decision-making. 248  Indeed, our 
proposals for democratizing rule development should result in more 
complete and balanced rulemaking records. This in turn could counteract a 
recent trend toward undue politicization of the rulemaking process and 
improve judicial review by providing courts with more comprehensive and 
accurate information for evaluating the reasonableness of agency decision-
making.  
It is, nevertheless, conceivable that mass comments could occasionally 
reflect a genuine groundswell of grassroots opposition to an agency’s 
proposal that was not anticipated or addressed earlier in the rulemaking 
process. In this situation, the agency should either address those comments 
when it promulgates the final rule or treat those comments as a trigger for 
further deliberation. Nina Mendelson has persuasively argued that mass 
comments will sometimes call for further deliberation, and she has 
suggested that agencies could use “focused polling, focus groups, public 
deliberation efforts, so-called citizen juries, or other devices” for this 
purpose.249 Mendelson’s proposal also raises a larger point that is worth 
remembering—agencies can use a variety of tools of public engagement to 
supplement notice and comment. That was, in fact, precisely the point of 
Regulation Room. Thus, for example, advisory committees, listening 
sessions and other public hearings, focus groups, web-based outreach, and 
even deliberative polls could likewise be used by agencies to supplement 
the traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. Moreover, 
some of these tools—including advisory committees, deliberative juries, 
and perhaps some forms of web-based outreach—could be used throughout 
the rulemaking process. The hosts of these supplemental discussions could 
summarize their results and submit those documents as official comments 
during notice-and-comment rulemaking. Cynthia Farina performed this role 
as part of the Regulation Room project, and her comments on behalf of 
Regulation Room had a significant influence on final rules adopted by 
CFPB and DOT.250 The key point is that democratizing rule development 
should not be viewed in isolation but rather as an indispensable component 
of a broader program to facilitate public engagement with rulemaking, 
which could significantly improve notice and comment in a variety of ways 
as part of this broader program. 
 
248. For a more radical proposal to tailor the standard of review to the extent of an agency’s public 
deliberations, see David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy Index 
Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (2005). 
249. See Mendelson, supra note 105, at 181.  












4. Building a Culture of Civic Participation 
Beyond improving the quality and legitimacy of individual regulations, 
democratizing rule development would also provide systemic benefits that 
are sorely needed in this era of political polarization, deep and growing 
inequality, and concerted efforts to dismantle the regulatory state. These 
broader benefits would accrue to individuals who participate, agencies that 
have access to a new cadre of actively involved citizens, and social 
movements with new levers for influencing policy and facilitating their 
organizational efforts. In short, democratizing rule development could help 
to build a culture of civic participation in government decision-making that 
would likely improve the health of American democracy. 
Individuals who participate in public engagement efforts are likely to 
become more informed and actively engaged citizens. They will have an 
opportunity to learn about the administrative process, the agency’s statutory 
mission, and the particular policy issues under consideration. They may be 
exposed to competing perspectives and learn about the complexities and 
trade-offs associated with most regulatory decision-making. They will 
likely also develop more refined views about the best approaches to 
regulatory problems. This knowledge and experience could lead those 
individuals to become more interested in policymaking generally and to 
seek other participatory opportunities. James Fishkin has reported, for 
example, that participation in deliberative polls “seems to create ‘better 
citizens,’ if one means by better citizens those who have developed civic 
capacities for dealing with public problems—information, efficacy, public 
spiritedness, and participation.”251 While the extent to which an individual 
is transformed by her interactions with an agency will plainly vary based on 
the nature of the experience and her own circumstances, it is conceivable 
that democratizing rule development could provide some of the same 
benefits traditionally attributed to involvement with civic associations. It is 
widely documented that participation by Americans in organizations of this 
nature has declined over the years.252 Yet it is also well established that 
active engagement with such groups provides a form of social capital, a 
broader sense of community, and an opportunity to engage in collective 
decision-making (often with citizens with competing political views) that is 
not commonly replicated outside of the workplace today.253 Even if one is 
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ambivalent about strong forms of communitarianism or classic civic 
republican theory, democratizing rule development realistically could 
provide mechanisms for promoting “civic virtue” by enhancing the civic 
capacities of participants and making them better prepared to serve as 
engaged members of our political community. 
Improving the civic capacity of citizens who participate in rule 
development would also provide systemic benefits for agencies. For 
starters, agencies could return to citizens who participate effectively for 
“repeat business” when they update their agendas or turn to related issues. 
Those citizens should be added to the agency’s “outreach directory,” so that 
its public engagement efforts can operate more efficiently and effectively 
based on prior experience. While agencies should plainly resist limiting 
their public engagement efforts to a new group of usual suspects, they could 
benefit from developing “mini-communities” of missing stakeholders and 
unaffiliated experts with demonstrated knowledge of and interest in 
particular recurring issues.254 The leaders of these mini-communities could 
then be tapped by agencies to help facilitate or moderate deliberations on 
related issues at future events. The Regulation Room researchers expressed 
the hope that their work would produce mini-communities with citizen 
leaders performing these functions over time, in addition to simply 
modeling best practices in public deliberation based on their development 
of civic capacities from prior successful experiences with the project.255 
And, of course, citizen deliberators need not be restricted to one mini-
community. Rather, citizens who demonstrate an aptitude for thoughtful 
public deliberation in one agency’s rule development proceedings could be 
affirmatively targeted by the outreach efforts of other agencies when their 
interests, craft expertise, or practical knowledge or experiences could prove 
similarly valuable. By using technological advances to assist with the 
identification of potentially useful commentators, agencies could begin to 
develop the “brain trust” or “directory of directories” envisioned by 
Noveck.256  
Finally, democratizing rule development could provide benefits for 
social movement groups by providing them with new levers for potentially 
influencing policy and enhancing their involvement with regulatory 
 
economic inequality, and the decline in civil society); see also MARC HETHERINGTON & JONATHAN 
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related problems.  
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governance. As Sabeel Rahman has explained, “[a]dministrative agencies 
and processes can be useful spaces in which to reshape the power dynamics 
between different interest groups, constituencies, and institutional 
levers.” 257  Rahman argues that by establishing institutional structures 
designed to deepen the linkages between public agencies and targeted 
constituencies, we can help politically powerless regulatory beneficiaries 
and other groups “expand their ability to mobilize, organize, and exercise 
influence.” 258  Social movements can sometimes accomplish more by 
establishing institutional structures that provide them (or their allies) with 
increased representation and influence within the regulatory process than 
they can with one-off policy victories. This strategy is also consistent with 
recent literature on law and social movements that focuses less on 
traditional impact litigation and instead emphasizes “the building of long-
term civil society organization, capacity, and leadership” and the 
importance of “creating a repertoire of action that goes beyond the 
articulation of grievance and advocacy, to the ability to share in the actual 
business of governing.”259 Democratizing rule development would provide 
substantial new upside potential for the implementation of such strategies 
by social movements. 
There are good reasons to believe that democratizing rule development 
would help to build a culture of civic participation that could improve the 
overall health of our democracy. Yet this claim is necessarily speculative to 
some extent because federal agencies have not engaged in systematic efforts 
to involve rulemaking novices in their agenda setting or rule development, 
and their periodic efforts to do so have received little scholarly attention. 
Both of these things must change if we ultimately hope to figure out the best 
ways of conducting public engagement with rulemaking and build a 
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broader, more inclusive, more deliberative, and more efficacious culture of 
civic participation in American government.  
CONCLUSION 
The requisite tools for democratizing rule development for the most part 
already exist, and unbeknownst to many regulatory scholars, agencies 
already use them. Our ACUS study unearthed countless examples of federal 
agencies using tools such as rulemaking petitions, advisory committees, 
focus groups, requests for information, listening sessions and other public 
hearings, hotlines or suggestion boxes, public complaints, various forms of 
web-based outreach, negotiated rulemaking, and ANPRMs to engage 
traditionally absent stakeholders in the process of developing their proposed 
rules. Yet this commendable work, in addition to being largely 
unrecognized, also has a tendency to be unsystematic, unstructured, and ad 
hoc. This raises serious concerns that agencies will undersupply 
participatory opportunities and that rule development could be dominated 
by the same sophisticated stakeholders that exert disproportionate influence 
over the notice and comment process. 
This Article provides a structural framework for facilitating meaningful 
public engagement with agenda setting and rule development that is 
responsive to these concerns. Yet democratizing the rulemaking process is 
easier said than done. For starters, the same obstacles that inhibit 
meaningful participation by rulemaking novices in notice and comment also 
exist during rule development. Rulemaking novices often lack the 
awareness, motivation, and capacity to participate effectively at each stage 
of the rulemaking process. We have shown how agencies can overcome 
these obstacles through thoughtful planning, targeted outreach, and 
educational efforts and how such efforts are more manageable during rule 
development than during notice and comment because the information load 
is typically lower and because situated knowledge and broad public values 
are generally more useful during the earlier stages of the process. 
Nevertheless, agencies will need to work consciously, continuously, and 
creatively to successfully overcome these barriers in practice. 
Similarly, one might legitimately worry that the same stakeholders that 
dominate notice and comment could also exert disproportionate influence 
over rule development, particularly since it does not have the same legal 
assurances of transparency as notice and comment.260 This concern is most 
acute when agencies use self-selective forms of public engagement open to 
anyone for purposes of consultation, such as rulemaking petitions, RFIs, 
 












ANPRMs, and listening sessions or other public hearings. But it can be 
counteracted by the targeted outreach and associated educational efforts we 
have described. The concern is less pressing for public engagement 
specifically designed to involve or collaborate with balanced cross-sections 
of the public, such as advisory committees, focus groups, and enhanced 
deliberative methods. The ability of regulated entities to dominate public 
engagement with rule development can also be counteracted by efforts to 
facilitate involvement by unaffiliated experts. Moreover, there is nothing to 
prevent agencies from being as transparent as possible in their efforts to 
democratize rule development, even without legal compulsion. Indeed, 
almost by definition, any serious public engagement effort aimed beyond 
the usual suspects must be transparent and well publicized, thus mitigating 
concerns with capture.  
The greatest obstacle to democratizing rule development is likely 
overcoming the political, institutional, and economic resistance to broader 
public engagement. This resistance is likely to come from a variety of 
quarters, including powerful regulated entities seeking to maintain their 
influence, agency officials skeptical of public engagement or otherwise set 
in their ways, certain members of Congress, and presidents who seek to 
commandeer agencies for their own regulatory or deregulatory goals. While 
the Trump administration was unlikely to be interested in these reforms, this 
project could easily be a high priority for President-elect Biden and could 
significantly advance his administration’s efforts to reconstruct and 
improve the regulatory state. There is, in fact, already substantial and 
growing pockets of support for enhanced public engagement with 
rulemaking among scholars, regulatory reformers, social movement 
activists, and—most importantly—among agency officials themselves, 
which is clearly demonstrated by the findings of our ACUS study and the 
recommendations of the Administrative Conference based on our work. 
Moreover, this Article has identified a host of reforms that would help to 
institutionalize public engagement with rule development even if some 
public officials are wary. 
Democratizing rule development will ultimately require nothing less 
than a shift in regulatory culture. This will not happen overnight, and it will 
require further study and experimentation, dedicated and creative leadership 
in Congress, the White House, and federal agencies, and buy in from social 
movement groups and interested members of the public. This cultural shift 
could also be aided by incremental efforts by individual agencies and 
officials that adopt the vision of civic engagement described in this Article 
and share the lessons of their efforts. Fully democratizing rulemaking will 
not be easy. But our democracy is currently on very shaky ground, and the 
magnitude of the stakes justifies the effort. Thus, democratizing rule 











development should be a central component of the regulatory reform 
agenda. At the very least, this vitally important and understudied topic 
deserves increased attention from scholars, government officials, and 
regulatory reformers. 
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